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ABSTRACT
In the late sum m er of 1982, the United States governm ent sent a
contingent of Marines to Lebanon to participate in a multinational peacekeeping
mission that included forces from France, Italy, and, eventually, Great Britain.
American intervention in Lebanon, which lasted for eighteen months, is most
often rem em bered for the suicide bombing of the M arine barracks on October
23,1983 that killed 241 Americans.
This thesis attem pts to place w hat happened on October 23 in the larger
context of American involvement in Lebanon. Despite the contentions of some
authors, the bombing was not an inexplicable aberration. American forces were
under siege long before the incident, but the Reagan adm inistration repeatedly
ignored the dangers confronting them. From the outset, American objectives in
Lebanon were not clearly defined. President Ronald Reagan and his advisers
w anted to stabilize the Lebanese government while orchestrating the withdrawal
of all foreign forces from the country. They unrealistically believed that a
contingent of 1,200 Marines would facilitate these policies.
Rather than helping the United States governm ent in the region, the
presence of the Marines in Beirut became a liability. The administration claimed
that the Americans were neutral peacekeepers, but in reality, they provided
direct support to the governm ent of Lebanon, arming and training soldiers loyal
to President Amin Gemayel. In the fall of 1983, American ships even began to
fire on targets that purportedly threatened the Lebanese Armed Forces.
American intervention in Lebanon between 1982 and 1984 was truly one
of w orst debacles in the history of American foreign relations. An examination
of American policy during this time will hopefully contribute to a more complete
understanding of the tragedy that unfolded on October 23.
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Introduction: One Bloody Sunday In Beirut
In the late sum m er of 1982, the United States governm ent sent a
contingent of Marines to Lebanon to participate in a multinational peacekeeping
mission that included forces from France, Italy, and, eventually, Great Britain.
American intervention in Lebanon, which lasted for eighteen months, is most
often rem em bered for the attack on the Marine com pound at Beirut
International Airport. Shortly after 6:20 in the morning on October 23, 1983, a
yellow Mercedes truck entered the parking lot on the southern side of the
Battalion Landing Team Headquarters. The driver of the truck circled the lot,
gunned the engine, and accelerated towards the building where approximately
350 Marines w ere sleeping.

The truck rolled over wire fences and swerved

around several defensive barriers before ramming into the building's lobby. As
he took cover, Lance Corporal Eddie DiFranco, one of the few surviving
witnesses, m anaged to get a brief glimpse of the driver. "He looked right at me
. . . smiled, that's it . . . . Soon as I saw [the truck] over here, I knew w hat was
going to happen," he later reported,! Less than a minute later, another suicide
bom ber dem olished the French barracks in Beirut. The second attack killed 58

i DiFranco quoted in Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: The Crusade of Modern Islam
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 71; for the best introduction to the Beirut attack
and its aftermath, see David C. M artin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story
of America's War Against Terrorism (New York: H arper & Row, 1988), 125-160; for the
Pentagon report on the incident, see Report O f The DOD Commission On Beirut
International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23 , 1983 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 20 December 1983), 32-33; Benis M. Frank, U.S. Marines In Lebanon,
1982-1984 (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps, 1987), 1-2; see also Thomas L. Friedman, "Buildings Blasted; Truck
Loaded With TNT Wrecks Headquarters of a Marine Unit," The New York Times, 24
October 1983: A l.
2

3
French paratroopers . 2 The subsequent FBI investigation revealed that the bomb
at the American barracks contained twelve thousand pounds of explosives,
which m ade it possible to rip the entire four-story concrete structure off its
foundation.
Initial reports placed the American death toll at 161, but that number
w ould eventually rise to 241.

Those w ho survived the attack will always

rem em ber w hat happened on that Sunday m orning in Beirut. "As soon as we
got up," recalled Lance Corporal Robert Calhoun, "you heard [what seemed to
be] about a thousand people screaming, 'H elp me. God help m e/

"3

Lance

Corporal Michael Petit, who had been sleeping in a building just north of the
com pound on October 23, vividly described the horrible scenes that followed the
explosion: "Everywhere I looked I saw bodies spraw led in gruesome positions.
One Marine, still in his sleeping bag, hung from a tree. The decapitated body of
another was under a jeep, his arms twisted at an impossible angle. The legs of
yet another jutted from beneath a huge slab of concrete . . . . That was the most
devastating m om ent of my life."4 In addition to those killed in action, over a
hundred Americans were injured in the attack. Lieutenant Colonel H oward
Gerlach survived, but he could no longer move his arms or legs. After coming
out of a coma, Gerlach asked his wife w hat had happened to his immediate
subordinates and learned that they were all dead.5

2 "2 Buildings Razed; Early-Morning Blasts Flit Command Structures Where
Troops Slept," The New York Times, 23 October 1983: A l; Wright, 72.
3 Calhoun quoted in Wright, 70.
4 Michael Petit, Peacekeepers at War: A Marine's Account of the Beirut Catastrophe
(Boston: Faber and Faber, 1986), 5-6.
5 Martin and Walcott, 128.

4
In writing about his experiences in Beirut, Petit concludes that "it grows
increasingly unlikely [with the passage of time] that anyone will ever be able to
entirely identify the motives behind the conflict."6 There is considerable truth to
this statement, but in a larger sense, of course, it is the obligation of historians to
ascertain these motives. U nderstanding Lebanon is by no means an easy task.
The following analysis attem pts to place the barracks bombing in the larger
context of American involvem ent in Lebanon. More than anything else, my
objective is to dismiss the argum ent that October 23 was somehow an
aberration. According to military historian Eric Hammel, the attack "was an
incident that had very little to do w ith and was wholly apart from the actual fact
of our 'presence' in Lebanon or, indeed, of the Lebanese civil war. Rather, I
believe, the bombing was the direct outgrow th of our leaders' having made
available a target of unprecedented magnitude in the center of a chaotic
- situation."7 From H am m el's perspective, in other words, the tragedy resulted
from faulty military decisionmaking.

If the Marines had been more widely

dispersed on the ground, the tragedy could have been averted. This type of
reasoning, however, obscures the reality of the situation in Beirut. In truth, the
Marines had been m oved to a central location in order to better protect them
from snipers and m ortar rounds. American forces w ere under siege long before
October 23, but the Reagan adm inistration repeatedly ignored the dangers
confronting them.
General John W. Vessey, Jr., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
6 Petit, ix.
7 Eric Hammel, The Root: The Marines in Beirut August 1982-Tebruary 1984 (San
Diego, N ew York, and London: H arcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), xxvii.
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under Reagan, has explained that the fundamental flaw of American intervention
in Lebanon was the idea "that things were going to get better." 8 Many observers
have noted that Lebanon was the Vietnam of the 1980s. This description is
intriguing in many ways, but it is also somewhat misleading. Contrary to the
declarations of the Reagan adm inistration after the barracks bombing, the
Marines had initially entered the country for reasons not directly related to the
Cold War. The Soviet Union became an issue only w hen Reagan was compelled
to defend the peacekeeping mission against its opponents.

Moreover, most

American soldiers in Vietnam at least had a basic understanding of their
objectives. In Lebanon, on the other hand, the Marines had widely disparate
interpretations of the reasons for their deployment. When journalist Thomas L.
Friedm an asked the final contingent of Marines leaving Beirut in 1984 to describe
the mission that they had been sent to perform, he received a variety of
responses.

Some reported that they w ere guarding the Beirut International

Airport. One Marine claimed that the objective was to bring religious freedom to
the people of Lebanon. Yet the most honest and direct response came from
Sergeant Jeffery Roberts: "The mission turned out to be a lot more than it was
originally supposed to be.

It got so big and broad it sort of sucked up

everything. People asked me w hy I was here. I really can't tell them. It was just
to be here. It was a political thing."9
The failure of American intervention in Lebanon can be attributed to many

8 Vessey quoted in Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of A Lifetime (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 357.
9 Roberts quoted in Thomas L. Friedman, "America's Failure In Lebanon," The
New York Times Magazine, 8 April 1984: 44, 62.
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factors. Since its inception in September 1982, the mission lacked clarity and
direction.

In the w ords of Colin Powell, w ho served as the military aide to

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, "Beirut w asn't sensible and never did
serve a purpose.
adm inistration

It was goofy from the beginning."10 The Reagan

publicly

described

the

Marine

contingent

as

a neutral

peacekeeping force. In reality, however, the Marines provided support to the
governm ent of Lebanon, arming and training soldiers loyal to President Amin
Gemayel.

The United States became increasingly supportive of the Gemayel

government, and in the fall of 1983, the navy fired on Suq-al-Gharb in order to
defend the Lebanese Arm ed Forces against the Druze militia. The Pentagon
commission that investigated the barracks bombing found considerable
disagreement over the relationship between the decision to shell Suq-al-Gharb
and October 23. While some officials believed that they were unrelated, the
Pentagon investigation revealed

that "[t]he prevalent view within the

USCINCEUR [Commander-in-Chief, Europe] chain of command, however, is
that there was some linkage between the two events."11
Historians will never know for sure w hat m otivated the attacks on the
French and American forces in Lebanon. In the afterm ath of the bombings,
intelligence reports implicated both Iran and Syria.

Defenders of Reagan's

foreign policy argue that October 23 was orchestrated by Iranian terrorists w ith a
long-standing grudge against the United States.

It is entirely likely that the

suicide attackers received assistance from radical groups in Iran and Syria, but in

10 Powell quoted in Cannon, 354.
11 Report O f The D O D Commission, 42.
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the final analysis, they needed to have support w ithin Lebanon in order to
successfully execute their mission. What happened on that gruesome Sunday
m orning in Beirut was m uch more than an extension of the Iranian Revolution; it
was an attem pt to perm anently drive the United States out of Lebanon.
The tragedy of American involvement in Lebanon is that one truck bomb
completely reversed foreign policy. After the deadly explosion, Reagan declared
that the continued presence of the Marines was "central to our credibility on a
global scale." i2 He repeatedly invoked the specter of communism in the
following m onths to justify the peacekeeping mission.

If the Gemayel

governm ent collapsed, he reasoned, Lebanon would certainly fall under the
influence of Syria, which received backing from the Soviet Union. A communist
dom inated Lebanon w ould not only threaten Israel but the entire Middle East.
At the beginning of February 1984, however, Reagan and his top advisers m ade
the decision to w ithdraw from Lebanon. Abandoning the peacekeeping mission
did not give rise to Soviet domination of the Middle East, and ironically, Syrian
soldiers have rem ained in Lebanon to the present day.
By any standard of m easurement, Lebanon is truly one of the worst
debacles in the history of American foreign relations.
biographer

Lou

Cannon,

"[t]he

story

of the

According to Reagan

Reagan

adm inistration's

involvement in Lebanon is a case study of foreign policy calamity." 13 Perhaps the
greatest tragedy of American intervention was that it exacerbated the problem
of M iddle Eastern terrorism. Many observers have depicted October 23 as the
12 Reagan quoted in Francis X. Clines, "Reagan Declares M arines' Role Is 'Vital'
To Counter Soviet In Lebanon; Toll At 192," The New York Times, 25 October 1983: A l.
13 Cannon, 340.
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tragic ending of a misguided venture into a foreign land, but in many ways, the
incident was only the beginning. In a recent PBS interview, Robert McFarlane,
Reagan's N ational Security Adviser at the time of the barracks bombing, made
the following observation about terrorism during the Reagan presidency:
"[terrorists] leanied that the American people can be traum atized by terrorism,
that it can create pressure on the government, and that our governm ent's]
response in the 1980s tended to be rather conventional and heavy-handed." 14 in
the case of Lebanon, terrorist groups discovered that they had more control over
American foreign policy than they had previously imagined.
*

ic

*

C. Vann W oodw ard long ago w arned about "[t]he twilight zone that lies
betw een living mem ory and w ritten history."15 So far, Lebanon has received
surprisingly little attention from historians, and as a result, I am fully aware of
the dangers presented by the so-called twilight zone. Since a substantial portion
of the docum ents pertaining to American intervention in Lebanon remain
classified, I have relied extensively on newspaper articles and memoirs w hen
piecing together my narrative. I supplem ented these sources w ith unpublished
Ph.D. dissertations, journal articles, and monographs. During the early stages of
this project, for instance, George Ball's assessment of American policy in Lebanon
was particularly helpful.
I have attem pted to make the most of the sources that I found, but it is
14 Robert McFarlane, PBS Frontline Target America Interview; transcript
retrieved December 30, 2001 from the W orld Wide Web: http: / / w w w .pbs.org/
w g b h /p ag es/ frontline/ show s/ targ et/in terv iew s/mcfarlane.html.
15 C. Vann W oodward, The Strange Career o f Jim Crow , third rev. ed. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1974), xvi.
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im portant to keep in m ind that definitive conclusions cannot be formulated until
more governm ent docum ents are de-classified. Hopefully, this thesis will be a
helpful starting point for researchers who come after me. The first chapter
examines how the United States became involved in Lebanon during the
sum m er of 1982, and it traces the evolution of Reagan's policies through the
bombing of the American embassy in Beirut in April 1983. The second chapter
begins w ith the May 17 agreement and ends w ith the w ithdraw al of American
forces in 1984.

C hapter 1: "No Reverse Gear"
Lebanon is a quagmire. Anyone there will get drawn
deeper and deeper into the engulfing morass .—Yitzhak Rabin1

If President Ronald Reagan and his administration had responded more
decisively during the sum m er of 1982, American intervention in Lebanon would
have been unnecessary. Secretary of State Alexander H aig's sympathy for Israel
clouded his judgment, and although it is unclear w hether he provided direct
approval for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, he certainly could have
done more to prevent the attack. On the day after A nw ar Sadat's funeral in
October 1981, Haig had spoken w ith Prime Minister Menachem Begin in Egypt.
According to Haig's account of this meeting, Begin informed him that Israel was
planning a military operation against targets associated with the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon.
States could not support the plan.

Haig told Begin that the United

"If you move, you move alone," he

reportedly said. "Unless there is a major, internationally recognized provocation,
the United States will not support such an action."2 But w hen Begin pushed him
on the matter, promising that the incursion would be relatively minor, Haig's
response was m uch m ore ambiguous.

He said that the proposal might be

sensible from an Israeli perspective, but he rem inded Begin that "Israel will be
alone if it carries out such a plan."3
In the m onths that followed Haig's encounter w ith Begin, Israel continued
1 Rabin quoted in George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: M y Years as Secretary of
State (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993) 233.
2 Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism , Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), 326.
3 Ibid., 327.
10

11
to develop plans for an invasion of Lebanon.

General Ariel Sharon, Israel's

Defense Minister, even shared these proposals with State Departm ent officials
while visiting the United States. Sharon said that Israel was considering two
possible strategies. While the first would simply eradicate the PLO in southern
Lebanon, the second entailed a full-scale offensive that w ould umte the Israelis
and the Christian Phalange in Beirut. Haig immediately recognized the gravity
of the situation.

"It was clear that Sharon was putting the United States on

notice: one m ore provocation by the Palestinians and Israel w ould deliver a
knockout blow to the PLO," he later recalled.4 Haig told Sharcn that the United
States could not sanction the invasion unless it was for the purpose of self
defense. As George Ball has pointed out, however, Haig could have threatened
to withhold military funding from Israel in order to deter Sharon's hawkish
tendencies.^ In the spring of 1982, the Reagan administration allowed Israel tc
give orders to the United States. The situation required decisive action, but the
responses em anating from the White House reflected a shocking level of
hesitancy. Sharon haughtily declared to Haig that "[n]o one has the right to tell
Israel w hat decision it should take in defense of its people."** Rather than
standing his ground and reminding Sharon that Israel's strength was dependent
on continued American assistance, Haig yielded to Sharon's intimidation tactics.
Israel finally had a reason to execute their w ar plans w hen terrorists shot
Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov in London on June 3, 1982. Ironically, the
4 Ibid., 335.
5 George W. Ball, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon: An Analysis of Israel's Invasion of
Lebanon and the Implications for U.S.-Israeli Relations (Washington, D.C.: Foundation For
Middle East Peace, 1984), 35.
6 Haig, 335.
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group responsible for the attem pted assassination opposed the leadership of
Yasser Arafat, but the Israelis were unconcerned with the distinction.7 The
following day Israel launched an air strike against a stadium in Beirut where the
PLO stored weapons

W hen the PLO opened fire on settlements in northern

Israel to retaliate, they played directly into the hands of Begin and Sharon,’* On
the m orning of June 6, three divisions of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attacked
Lebanon. Contrary to the expectations of many experts, however, Israel did not
restrict "Operation Peace For Galilee" to PLO targets in southern Lebanon. The
IDF quickly established air supremacy, but despite their initial gains, they were
unable to capture the strategic Beirut-Damascus Highway.Q The Israelis engaged
Syrian forces, pushed northw ard, and surrounded Beirut by the middle of June.
Rather than directly attacking Beirut, Sharon decided to bombard the city. The
IDF cut off the city's supply of water and electricity, extensively bombed West
Beirut horn June to August, and repeatedly broke cease fires. During the final
phase of the bom bardm ent, Israel intentionally targeted residential and
commercial areas, and over 90% of the casualties that resulted were noncombatants. io
President Reagan reacted slowly to Israel's protracted siege of Beirut. At
the beginning of August, the United Nations ordered a cease-fire, which the
United States supported. But w hen Israel ignored the resolution, the Reagan
7 Ball, 36.
8 Dan Bavly and Eliahu Salpeter, Fire In Beirut: Israel's War in Lebanon with the
PLO (New York: Stein and Day, 1984), 12.
9 Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, trans. Ina Friedman (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 132.
to Michael Jansen, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon (London: Zed
Press, 1982), 49.

13
adm inistration seemed reluctant to alienate Begin. After Israel assented to a
peace agreem ent on A ugust 11 that had been arranged by Ambassador Philip
Habib, the United States special envoy to the Middle East, Sharon responded on
the next day w ith an eleven hour air campaign that killed an estimated three
hundred peopled! Sharon's defiance led Reagan to personally intervene in the
situation.

A ppalled by the bloody television reports coming out of Beirut,

Reagan told Begin in a phone call that the bombing had to end. According to
Reagan's description of the conversation in his memoirs, "I used the w ord
'H olocaust' deliberately and said the symbol of his country was becoming 'a
picture of a seven m onth old baby w ith its arms blcv n off/

"12

These were

certainly harsh w ords from the American president, and not sur prisingly, Begin
ordered an imm ediate halt to the bombing of West Beirut. Habib's negotiations
now m oved forw ard more easily, eventually producing an agreement for the
withdrawal of PLO guerrillas from Beirut.

Supporters of Reagan have

com m ended him for acting so assertively with Begin. One wonders, however,
why Reagan did not intervene earlier. By the time he placed a phone call to
Begin in August, the IDF h ad been in Lebanon for over two months. Using
sophisticated American equipment, Israel had killed a countless number of
civilians and left thousands homeless. Yet Reagan and his administration did
nothing of any substance until public opinion shifted against the Israeli invasion
in August. If Reagan had called Begin two months earlier on June 12, when
Israel's military intentions became abundantly clear, it is entirely possible that a

11
12

Ball, 45.
Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 428.
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great deal of the violence could have been averted.

Moreover, swifter

intervention on the part of the Reagan adm inistration would have m ade it less
necessary to involve the Marines.
As many of his biographers have noted, however, Reagan avoided conflict
w henever possible.

This decisionmaking strategy would have deadly

consequences in Lebanon. From the beginning of July, Habib had urged Reagan
to commit American forces to assist w ith the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut.
He believed that the United States could maintain the peace by taking a position
betw een the IDF and the PLO. In retrospect, a peacekeeping contingent from the
United Nations probably w ould have been the better option, but at the time,
Israel opposed such a plan.

Arafat m ade it clear that the PLO would not

w ithdraw from Lebanon w ithout protection from the Israeli attack, and
interestingly enough, he suggested that the United States could provide the
safety needed for his departure.13

Habib supported this proposal, and he

promised Arafat that the United States would protect the Palestinians who would
rem ain in the country. Reagan finally ordered eight hundred Marines to Beirut
on A ugust 20 to oversee the removal of PLO guerrillas. After arriving in the Port
of Beirut, the Marines installed several checkpoints in the immediate area. At
Checkpoint 54, trucks filled w ith Arafat's men stopped for a brief inspection. The
Marines observed while a Lebanese civilian m ade sure that the m en were not
carrying any w eapons other than AK-47s and handguns. After passing through
the checkpoint, the trucks proceeded to the awaiting ships. PLO fighters fired

13 Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut To Jerusalem (New York: Farrar Straus
Giroux, 1989), 190.
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their weapons in the air as they departed, but for the most part, the evacuation
process w ent smoothly. By the first week of September, the rem ainder of the
PLO had m ade their exit.14
The success of the mission was impressive by any standard. In less than
tw o weeks, the Marines m anaged to safely remove over 10,000 PLO combatants
along w ith Yasser Arafat. The Marines had achieved their objective, and taking
the advice of both Vessey and Weinberger, Reagan approved their w ithdraw al
on September 10. The Reagan adm inistration now had good reason to fee1
optimistic about the future of Lebanon as well as the Middle East.

While

vacationing in California, Reagan delivered a televised speech in which he
outlined his plans for M iddle East peace. The September 1 speech later became
know n as the Reagan Plan, and in essence, it involved three underlying
principles. It called on Israel to halt further settlement of the West Bank and to
return m uch of the land that they acquired in 1967.

In addition, Reagan

proposed that the Palestinians should receive their own government, which
w ould be developed under the guidance of Jordan.15 Begin immediately
denounced the Reagan Plan in front of the Knesset, declaring that Israel would
never relinquish the West Bank and Gaza. "We have no reason to get on our
knees.

No one will determ ine for us the borders of the Land of Israel," he

proclaimed.16 Many Arab leaders, however, responded enthusiastically to
Reagan's announcement. Jordan's King Hussein described the plan as "the most

14 For a description of the PLO evacuation, see Hammel, 21-29.
15 Cannon, 355.
1(5 Begin quoted in Ball, 53.

16
courageous stand taken by an American adm inistration since 1956." 17 In reality,
Reagan's peace initiative did nothing to bring stability to the Middle Bast. The
settlement program s increased, the American loans to Israel kept flowing, and
the adm inistration essentially abandoned the plan that Secretary cf State George
Shultz, w ho replaced Haig at the end of June, had worked so hard to develop.
A lthough the first week of September was a time of unprecedented hone,
subsequent events w ould quickly reveal that this optimism was nothing more
than an illusion.

On the afternoon of September 14, Bashir Gemayel, the

president-elect of Lebanon, began a speech to his Phalange supporters but never
finished it. A bomb exploded in the apartm ent above the political gathering,
killing Gemayel and several of his close followers. 18 Gemayel had been an ally of
both the United States and Israel.
Secretary

Shortly before Gemayel's assassination,

of Defense Weinberger m et w ith him while visiting Beirut.

W einberger claims that Gemayel w anted the United States governm ent to "use
Lebanon as its strategic outpost in the Middle East." 19 Gemayel understood the
significance of Cold War politics, and it appears that his conversation with
W einberger was an attem pt to exploit American fears of Soviet domination in
the region. American soldiers stationed in Lebanon could be used to block the
spread of communism while bringing peace and stability to his country. The
Reagan adm inistration would later say that Lebanon was an area of immense
strategic importance, but if the country truly had such a pivotal role in

17 King H ussein quoted in Cannon, 355.
is Schiff and Ya'ari, 247.
19 Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting For Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon
(New York: W arner Books, 1990), 146.

17
geopolitics, it is hard to explain why Weinberger dismissed Gemayel's proposal
w ithout even considering it.
The m urder of Bashir Gemayel set in m otion a chain of events that would
lead to the second American intervention in Lebanon. On the day after the
assassination, the IDF m oved into West Beirut. The Israeli com mander perm itted
Phalange militiamen to enter the Sabra and Shatila refugee settlements, which
housed thousands of impoverished Palestinians. The militiamen explained to the
Israelis that they w ere searching for terrorists, and beginning on September 16,
they proceeded to massacre hundreds of the people living in the camps while the
Israelis did nothing. It remains uncertain how many v/ere slaughtered in the
three day rampage, but some place the death toll at over 1,000. Tragicall}7, a
significant num ber of those killed were women and children.20 In the afterm ath
of the massacre, Ariel Sharon resigned from his position amid considerable
controversy. While Israel received m uch of the blame for w hat happened at
Sabra and Shatila, Reagan officials had their ow n reasons to feel guilty. Philip
Habib had prom ised Arafat that the Marines w ould guarantee the safety of those
that rem ained in Beirut after the evacuation. Rather than leaving the Marines in
Lebanon, however, Reagan pulled them out after only seventeen days, thirteen
days earlier than expected. Everyone recognized that the tragedy could have
been avoided if the Marines had not left the area. More than anything else, the
feelings of guilt and embarrassment contributed to the second deploym ent of
Marines.

Robert McFarlane essentially adm itted this during a symposium at

20 Jansen, 106; see also Schiff and Ya'ari, 250-285; for the best contemporary
account of the massacre, see Thomas L. Friedman, "The Beirut Massacre: The Four
Days," The New York Times, 26 September 1982: Section 1, page 19.

18
Quantico in 1993. According to his recollection of events, the Marines returned to
Lebanon in w hat was nothing more than a "feel good mission, an apology really;
a way of showing support w ithout much recognition of the vulnerabilities that
you w ere creating at the tim e."21
President Reagan formally announced on September 20 that the Marines
would return to Lebanon.

Unlike the previous mission, it is important to

em phasize that the new objectives were not entirely clear. In a letter to Robert
Dillon, the American Ambassador to Lebanon, Deputy-Prime Minister Fouad
Boutros officially requested that the United States send 1,200 military personnel
to Lebanon as part of a multinational "interposition force" to "facilitate the
restoration of Lebanese G overnment sovereignty and authority over the Beirut
area, and thereby further efforts of my governm ent to assure the safety of
persons in the area and bring to an end the violence which has tragically
recurred."22 H ow the multinational force was supposed to accomplish this
mission rem ained

a m b i g u o u s 23

The letter from Boutros is particularly revealing

in that it proposes a close relationship between the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF) and the United States.

The Reagan adm inistration w ould repeatedly

contend that the Marines stationed in Lebanon were neutral and that they were
there only to preserve the peace. Yet according to conditions established by
21 McFarlane quoted in John Benson Matthews, "United States Peacekeeping In
Lebanon 1982-1984: Why It Failed" (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., W ashington State
University, 1994), 55.
22 Fouad Boutros to Robert Dillon, 25 September 1982, Ronald Reagan Library
(White House Staff and Office Files: Bums, William J.: Box 91834, 31 January 1984, CPPG
Meeting), 1-2.
23 H ow ard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, Twin Pillars To Desert Storm:
America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush (New York: William
M orrow and Company, 1993), 216.
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Boutros, the Americans were asked to "operate in close coordination with the
L A F ." 2 4

in order to solidify the alliance between the two forces, liaison officers

w ould be exchanged between them. Ambassador Dillon quickly sent a reply to
Boutros in which he accepted the conditions that had been outlined in the letter.25
The Joint Chiefs of Staff developed a mission statem ent for the second
deploym ent of Marines that did not clarify the diplomatic notes exchanged on
September 25. The stated objective of American forces was "[tjo establish an
environm ent which will perm it the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their
responsibilities in the Beirut area . . . . [and] to occupy and secure positions along
a designated section of the line from south of the Beirut International A irport to a
position in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace." 26 During the next fourteen
months, the mission statem ent was modified only four times.27 The available
evidence suggests that the Reagan adm inistration agreed to the formation of the
second multinational force for political reasons. If the future stability of Lebanon
was critical to American interests in the Middle East, it remains unclear why
Reagan authorized the insertion of only 1,200 servicemen. W hat is even more
puzzlingly is the fact that no one gave m uch thought to the implementation of
the mission on the ground. According to John Benson Matthews, "the stated
mission was ill-conceived, ill-defined and improperly executed." 28 When asked to
describe the goals of the mission, officials within the White House frequently
24 Fouad Boutros to Robert Dillon, 25 September 1982, 2.
25Robert Dillon to Fouad Boutros, 25 September 1982, Ronald Reagan Library
(White House Staff and Office Files: Bums, William J.: Box 91834, 31 January 1984, CPPG
Meeting), 1-2.
26 Report O f The D O D Commission, 35.
27 Ibid., 37.
28 Matthews, v.
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gave contradictory answers.

"Since no one seemed to know just w hat the

[M]arines were supposed to do nor was any clarification made later/' argued
George Ball, "the terms of their projected stay was left in great confusion w ith
the Administration shifting carelessly from one formulation to

a n o t h e r . "29

Despite the confusion, adm inistration officials claimed that the Marines and
their counterparts in the multinational force were peacekeepers. In essence, they
w ere misleading the American public by only telling half of the story.

The

Marines arrived in Lebanon to preserve the peace and to uphold the governm ent
of Am in Gemayel, Bashir's brother. Given the size of the American force, both
objectives w ere unrealistic from the beginning. Moreover, by forming a close
alliance w ith the Lebanese Arm ed Forces, the United States was by no means a
neutral and disinterested party to the ongoing conflict within Lebanon. Shortly
after the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, an American military team visited
Beirut in order to evaluate the LAF. The leader of the delegation was Major
General Gerald T. Bartlett, and since he had helped to train forces in Saudi Arabia,
the military viewed him as a Middle East expert. Published in November, the socalled Bartlett Report held that the LAF could maintain the peace after eighteen
m onths of training and could patrol the country's borders w ithin three years.3°
The Bartlett Report closely resembled the military assessments perform ed during
the early years of the Vietnam War. While addressing strategic concerns like
m anpow er and weaponry, it did not adequately consider the unique historical
circumstances that pervaded the Lebanese conflict. Some military officials have

29 BaU, 62.
30Matthews, 99.
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also questioned the facts contained in the report. Colonel Patrick Collins has
publicly adm itted the duplicity of the military review performed in the fall of
1982: "We came to the conclusion, after visiting every bloody company in the
Lebanese Army, that M ahatma Gandhi and Jesus Christ couldn't get that army
together in two years if they had the w ind behind them. The army did not exist,
and the Bartlett Report was a bunch of baloney "31
By the time Bartlett and his colleagues announced their findings, the
Marines had been in Lebanon for nearly two months.

The report did not

significantly alter their mission, but in December, they began to provide basic
training to the LAF.32 More importantly, the idea that the LAF could uphold the
peace on their own within eighteen months contributed to an illusion that is
indicative of American foreign policy in the twentieth century. Provide a foreign
army with American weaponry and training, according to this logic, and it is only
a matter of time before that army can create a country favorable to American
interests. Yet as the United States learned in the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam, a large
group of men with guns cannot make a nation if they lack popular support. The
Reagan administration never questioned the legitimacy of the Lebanese
government, and throughout American intervention in the country, they
continued to cling to an illusion.
Nothing reflects this illusion better than National Security Decision
Directive 64. Entitled "Next Steps In Lebanon" and signed by Reagan on October
28, 1982, NSDD 64 outlined the "two principal objectives" of American

31 Colonel Patrick Collins quoted in Ibid., 102.
32 Hammel, 58.
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involvement in the multinational

f o r c e .3 3

The first objective was "the prom pt

disengagement and quickest orderly w ithdraw al of Israeli, Syrian and Palestinian
arm ed forces from

L e b a n o n / ' 34

According to NSDD 64, this withdrawal could be

achieved by the end of 1982. Reagan and his foreign policy advisors, in other
words, believed that the Syrians, Israelis, and Palestinians would all volunteer to
abandon their interests in Lebanon in only tw o months. The Syrians had been
asked to intervene in the Lebanese Civil War in 1976, and they had stationed
soldiers in Lebanon since that time. The expectation that they w ould disengage
from Lebanon reflected an incredibly unrealistic assessment of the situation.
Likewise, although the United States had a closer relationship w ith Israel, the
Israelis expressed little interest in w ithdraw ing from the country after having
sacrificed so m uch during the June invasion.
The second objective delineated in NSDD 64 was the restoration of the
Lebanese government.

It committed the United States to strengthening the

ability of the governm ent to provide internal security, and it called for the
rebuilding of the

L A F .3 5

Like the first objective, the second dow nplayed the

complexity of the Lebanese conflict.

The officials responsible for NSDD 64

seemed to think that the Israelis, Syrians, and Palestinians were the only obstacle
to a sovereign and peaceful Lebanon. Yet there was also a seemingly endless list
of internal factions that did not recognize the authority of the Gemayel
government. In essence, both objectives revealed a profound ignorance of w hat

33 National Security Decision Directive 64,28 October 1982, Ronald Reagan
Library, 1.
3 4 Ibid., 1.
35 Ibid., 1.
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was actually happening in Beirut at the time. Senator Sam N unn (DemocratGeorgia) w ould later characterize American objectives in Lebanon as "mission
impossible/' arguing that Reagan had placed the Marines in an "untenable
military position.'^6 The Reagan adm inistration w anted a stable Lebanese
governm ent, a pow erful Lebanese army, and the removal of all foreign armies
from the country.

To accomplish these goals, Reagan sent 1,200 Marines to

participate in a multinational force that included soldiers from France, Italy, and,
eventually, Great Britain. This was truly an impossible mission. In the final
paragraph of NSDD 64, there is a brief acknowledgement of the dangers
associated w ith American intervention in Lebanon.

However, since "our

initiatives and our commitment to Lebanon's independence will further
strengthen our credibility and dem onstrate our determ ination to continue the
progress we have already made," Reagan gave his approval for continued
involvement.37 Interestingly, there is not a single reference to the Soviet Union
in NSDD 64, which supports the argum ent that the threat of communism was
something used to justify the mission after everything had gone terribly wrong.
The Marines, of course, were largely unaw are of the policy decisions that
led to their deployment.

They arrived in Beirut on September 29, and they

established their headquarters at Beirut International Airport.

The Marines

discovered that the area surrounding the airport was quite dangerous, since
thousands of pieces of unexploded ordnance had accumulated from years of
warfare. Before the Americans could move freely, mine-clearing teams were

36 NBC, Meet The Press, 23 October 1983.
37 NSDD 64,2.
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dispatched to remove the ordnance. On September 30, Corporal David Reagan,
a military engineer directing a mine-clearance team, somehow touched off a
cluster bomblet that had been m anufactured in the United States and used by the
Israelis during their invasion. The explosion sent pellets into his stomach and
head. Despite attem pts to revive him, David Reagan became the first American
servicemen killed in

L e b a n o n . 38

Reagan's death m arked an ominous beginning

to the second American intervention. Although the mission began w ith good
intentions, it quickly became clear that administration officials had entangled
themselves in a violent and chaotic environment that they did not fully
com prehend.
In response to the first casualty in Lebanon, some politicians attem pted to
invoke the W ar Powers Act. Signed into law in November 1973 over Richard
Nixon's veto, the act requires the President to provide official notification to
Congress w ithin 48 hours w henever American troops are committed to combat.
If Congress does not approve the action, it m andates the w ithdraw al of all
personnel w ithin sixty days.

Representative Clement J. Zablocki (Democrat-

Wisconsin), for instance, compared American intervention in Lebanon to a
person walking barefoot in a glass factory.
"[y]ou're bound to get

c u t . " 39

Given the situation, he said,

Zablocki believed that further hostilities were

almost a certainty, and he called on Reagan to give notification in the event of
another incident. Senator Thomas F. Eagleton (Democrat-Missouri), one of the

38 Hammel, 41; William E. Farrell, "Marine Units Moving Cautiously Into ShellLittered Areas of Beirut," The New York Times, 2 October 1982: Section 1, page 8.
39 David Shribman, "New Questions Arise Over War Act," The New York Times, 1
October 1982: A8.
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co-authors of the War Powers Act, wrote a letter to Reagan in which he outlined
the relevance of Section 4a.

Since he anticipated that Lebanon was a place

"where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances," Eagleton argued that Reagan was obligated by law to notify
C o n g r e s s . 40

The Reagan administration denied the applicability of the War

Powers Act, claiming that there was no expectation of Marine involvement in
future hostilities.

As the situation in Lebanon unfolded, however, these

expectations w ould be shattered on more than one occasion. The Marines would
indeed find themselves walking barefoot in a glass factory.
Yet the Marines in Beirut encountered little hostility from any faction until
they had been there for almost six months. Since Americans did not become
engaged in fighting, critics of Reagan's approach to the Lebanese crisis were
essentially silenced. It appeared that the multinational force had helped to bring
renew ed stability to the region after the tragic events in September. In fact,
many Muslims in Lebanon initially welcomed the presence of Americans. It
seemed to them that the Americans had arrived to prevent future Israeli attacks
on innocent civilians, and they viewed the Marines as a relatively neutral party.
W hen the Marines w ent out on routine patrols, they frequently received warm
greetings from the Lebanese people. An elderly Druze w om an told John Benson
M atthews that the Americans gave her a new sense of hope. "We are so tired of
the killing," she allegedly said, "maybe it will all end now that you're here."41
Horrified by the atrocities committed at Sabra and Shatila, the non-Christian
40 Senator Thomas F. Eagleton to President Ronald Reagan, 23 September 1982,
Ronald Reagan Library (WHORM Subject File, CO086, Casefile 100743), 1.
41 Matthews, 142.

26
factions w ithin Lebanon w anted protection from their enemies. They correctly
believed that Marines came to Beirut as a result of the September massacres, but
w hat they did not recognize at first was the close relationship between Amin
Gemayel and the United States. Given the positive reception from the Lebanese,
military leaders felt comfortable w hen asked to expand the patrols.

Reagan

authorized the Marines to extend their presence to heavily Christian East Beirut,
and in the early p art of November, they began to patrol the infamous Green
Line, the boundary betw een East and West Beirut 42
W hen the adm inistration came under fire in the afterm ath of the barracks
bombing, military officials w ould rem ind Congress about the w arm welcome
that they had received at the beginning of their mission. They pointed out that
the Marines did not experience significant violence for several months. At some
point in the future, historians will w onder w hether this type of assessment was
accurate or self-serving.

Did the Marines really come into contact w ith

supportive Muslim communities or were their recollections exaggerated to
justify w hy they had been sent to Lebanon? In the absence of reliable sources, it
is difficult to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. Nevertheless, it does
appear that the Marines received support from factions that would eventually
turn against them.

O n November 11, for example, Americans in the

multinational force joined Lebanese Independence Day celebrations by running
in a 10K road race through the streets of Beirut. They encountered no opposition
along the way, and M atthews correctly observes that "[terrorists] could have

42 Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan To Expand Duties Of Marines Into East Beirut,"
The New York Times, 2 Novem ber 1982: A l.
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shot any num ber of them as they jogged the streets of Beirut, unarm ed, and in
their running shorts."43 Participation in a public event such as this would become
unthinkable a year later, and while the absence of terrorist attacks in the early
months of American intervention does not prove that none were considered, it
certainly suggests that the Marines did experience a brief period of peace in
Beirut.
The M arines were never neutral peacekeepers, but they did perform
duties that are often associated w ith peacekeeping missions.

A t the end of

February 1983, an unusually harsh w inter storm descended on Lebanon.

In

conjunction w ith the Red Cross, the Marines conducted a relief mission to the
desolate m ountainous region east of Beirut, They traveled nineteen hours to the
village of Q atarba w here they found snow drifts that w ere sixteen feet high in
certain spots. The Americans evacuated anyone in need of medical treatment,
dug through the snow to look for survivors, and provided food and heating fuel
to the
Beirut.

v illa g e r s .

44 After completing the evacuations, the Marines returned to

The February rescue was one of the few tangible achievements of

America's

eighteen m onth

involvement in

the

country.

In freezing

tem peratures, the Marines had climbed treacherous m ountain roads in order to
save lives.

Yet even in w hat was certainly their finest hour, the Marines

participated in the mission at the request of the Lebanese government. It also
should be noted that Qatarba has a predom inantly Christian

p o p u la tio n .4 5

A lthough the rescue operation was a hum anitarian effort, it was far from neutral.
43 Matthews, 137.
44 Hammel, 68-71.
45 ibid., 69.
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In fact, one w onders w hether the Gemayel governm ent w ould have asked for
assistance if the village had been a Muslim stronghold.
There are some M iddle East experts w ho contend that the United States
missed a an excellent opportunity between October and February to resolve the
Lebanese crisis. According to Augustus Richard Norton, "October, November,
and December 1982 were three critical months in which the future of Lebanon
was to be fatefully

s h a p e d . " 46

The w indow of opportunity thesis has been

endorsed by m any of Reagan's top foreign policy advisers. Geoffrey Kemp, a
high ranking National Security Council official during the Reagan administration,
adam antly believes that there could have been "a different outcome to the
Lebanon tragedy if the United States responded in a different

w a y . " 47

From the

perspectives of both N orton and Kemp, the objectives enshrined in NSDD 64
were achievable. The Syrians had been weakened by the Israeli invasion, and if
the United States had only p u t more pressure on them, they w ould have left
Lebanon. In essence, since America did not act quickly enough, the Soviet Union
supplied the Syrians w ith new equipment, which m ade it less necessary for them
to acquiesce to American demands. N orton and Kemp correctly observe that the
Reagan adm inistration could have done more to intervene diplomatically during
the so-called w indow of opportunity. Yet even if the United States had acted
differently in the final months of 1982, it is unlikely that Syria would have
rem oved their troops from Lebanon w ithout a major confrontation.

The

w indow of opportunity thesis also neglects the internal dynamics of the

46 N orton quoted in M atthews, 129.
4 7 Kemp quoted in Ibid., 129.
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Lebanese conflict. Like the authors of NSDD 64, N orton and Kemp gave much
consideration to the presence of foreign countries in Lebanon, b u t they failed to
adequately consider the multiple factions within the country that made peace
close to impossible. Ironically, even in criticizing the foreign policy of the Reagan
adm inistration, these experts have been overly optimistic about the possibility of
an alternative outcome to America's involvement in Lebanon.
In reality, the w indow of opportunity for success in Lebanon closed much
earlier than N orton has suggested. When Reagan decided to deploy the second
„ multinational force to Beirut in September 1982, he expected that the American
presence w ould lead to peace. Yet his failure to assign realistic objectives to the
mission put American lives in jeopardy. Between October and February, the
Marines experienced almost no resistance from the warring factions in the
region. But everything began to change during the m onth of March. The Italian
contingent of the multinational force came under fire on March 15 when
unidentified m en fired rocket-propelled grenades at two Italian jeeps traveling in
the vicinity of the Beirut International Airport.

After Italian reinforcements

arrived on the scene, the gunm en fired on them as well. Nine Italians were
w ounded in the incident, and at the time, reports indicated that two of the m en
had been paralyzed while another lost his right

f o o t . 48

On the following day,

five Americans on patrol in Beirut received m inor shrapnel wounds after
someone tossed a hand grenade at them. None of the Marines were seriously
hurt, and they quickly returned to active

d u t y .4 9

48 "5 U.S. Marines A nd 9 Italians W ounded In Lebanon/' The New York Times, 17
March 1983: A ll.
49 Hammel, 74-75.
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Although it was unclear w hether the attacks had been coordinated, all of
the m em bers of the multinational force recognized that the violence was an
attem pt to underm ine their mission. Colonel James Mead, the com m ander of
the M arines in Lebanon, promised that "[w]e will not allow a single act of
terrorism to stop us from our m ission/' and White House spokesperson Larry
Speakes assured reporters that it was only an "isolated incident." 50 Subsequent
events w ould reveal that Speakes had offered an inaccurate assessment of the
situation. O n March 17, the Italians returned fire in four different incidents. The
next day tw o hand grenades w ere throw n at thirty French paratroopers in
Chiyah, b u t no one was w ounded in the

a tta c k

s i The four days of violence in

March m arked the conclusion to over five months of peace, and from that point
to the w ithdraw al of American forces in 1984, it became abundantly clear that
elements w ithin Lebanon w anted the multinational force gone. The evidence
obviously indicates that the Marines and their counterparts were being targeted.
Despite the tragic turn of events in the middle of March, the Reagan
adm inistration did not re-consider its policy in Lebanon. The Marines were there
as peacekeepers, and they w ould rem ain until Lebanon was stable.

No one

seemed to understand that the 1,200 Americans serving in the multinational force
were at the center of an incredibly dangerous situation. From Reagan's vantage
point, there was simply "no reverse gear" to American intervention in
Lebanon.52
50 "5 U.S. Marines A nd 9 Italians W ounded In Lebanon," A ll.
51 "Italians Attacked Again In Beirut; Terror Campaign Feared By Some," The
New York Times, IS March 1983: A6; Jonathan C. Randal, "French Unit in Lebanon
Repels Grenade Attack," The Washington Post, 19 March 1983: A22.
52 Reagan quoted in Hammel, 75.
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The president of the United States, of course, always has the ability to
reverse previous foreign policy decisions. Yet from the beginning of America's
participation in the multinational force, Reagan m ade promises that severely
limited his options in Lebanon. His lofty rhetoric committed the United States to
a situation that w ould markedly deteriorate after the March attacks.

On April

18, 1983, a van loaded w ith explosives detonated in front of the American
embassy in Beirut. Of the sixty-three people killed in the blast, seventeen were
Americans.

The explosion was particularly devastating for the Central

Intelligence Agency, w hich lost both Kenneth Haas, the Beirut station chief, and
Robert Ames, the agency's top Middle East

e x p e r t .5 3

Many Americans in the

embassy sustained serious injuries. Chief W arrant Officer Rayford Byers, who
was helping to train the LAF, "lost his left eye, suffered head injuries which
required two craniotomies, broke both collar bones, his left arm, and all his
r ib s ." 5 4

Byers rem ained conscious despite the agonizing pain, and his screams

eventually drew the attention of a Lebanese boy. Ambassador Robert Dillon
found himself trapped under a piece of debris, but w ith the assistance of other
embassy workers, he m anaged to escape from the building unscathed. In the
days that followed, Consul Diane Dillar shuttled from the morgue and
emergency room at American University Hospital to the embassy in order to
determ ine who had

been killed.55 For someone accustomed to the routine

53 M artin and Walcott, 109.
Ibid., 104; see also Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Beirut Embassy Bombed," The
New York Times, 19 April 1983: A l.
55 State D epartm ent Situation Listing, American Embassy Beirut to Secretary of
State, 28 June 1983, Ronald Reagan Library (White House Staff and Office Files:
Executive Secretariat, NSC: Records: Cable Files), 2-3.
54
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bureaucratic w ork of an embassy, it m ust have been an incredibly difficult task.
The severity of the explosion was unprecedented, but it was not entirely
unexpected.

Shortly before the incident, the National Security Agency

intercepted messages that suggested an attack on the multinational force was
imminent. Unfortunately, the intercepts did not contain any specific information
about the deadly plot.5^ W hen reports of the bombing reached Washington, the
Reagan adm inistration reacted w ith shock and outrage. At the beginning of his
presidency, Reagan had assured all Americans that the United States would have
no tolerance for international terrorism. "Let terrorists bew are that w hen the
rules of international behavior are violated," he proclaimed, "our policy will be
one of swift and effective retribution." 57 Reagan made this declaration at a White
H ouse ceremony to celebrate the return of the Americans w ho had been held
hostage in Iran for 444 days. After the embassy attack in April 1983, Reagan
appeared ready to uphold his policy on terrorism. He told the families of the
victims that the suicide bombing was an "act of unparalleled cowardice" that
"was an attack on all of us, on our way of life and on the values w e hold dear."58
Rather than w ithdraw ing from Lebanon, Reagan said that the United States had
an obligation to remain in the country. "We would indeed fail them if we let that
act deter us from carrying on their mission of brotherhood and peace," he
w arned.59
Surprisingly, Reagan did not retaliate against the terrorists responsible for

56 M artin and Walcott, 105.
57 Ibid., 43.
58 Reagan quoted in Cannon, 360.
59 Reagan quoted in Ibid., 360.
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the explosion. The National Security Agency had decoded intercepts linking the
plot to the Iranian Foreign Ministry and the Iranian Embassy in Syria, but despite
the quality of the evidence, which included a $25,000 money transfer from Iran to
finance the operation, the Reagan administration did not execute its policy of
swift and effective retribution.60 Instead of retaliating, Reagan renew ed
America's commitment to the faltering Gemayel government.

The CIA did

manage to track dow n four suspects in the case, and one of the agents involved
in the interrogation was eventually fired for brutally beating confessions out of
the prisoners. The inform ation obtained from the suspects confirmed that the
attack originated in Syria, but interestingly, it appears that most of the m en who
participated in the execution of the mission lived in Lebanon.

In fact, the

conspirators had even m anaged to recruit a Palestinian worker in the American
Embassy to signal them w hen Ambassador Dillon was in the building.61 The
involvement of Lebanese civilians in the attack contradicts the idea that it was
entirely unrelated to United States foreign policy. While the evidence indicates
that Iran and Syria were key participants, it also reveals that the success of the
plot depended on local support. It remains unclear why these m en decided to
join the suicide mission, but they obviously did not consider the Americans in
Beirut to be neutral peacekeepers.
If nothing else, the embassy bombing in April should have prom pted
Reagan and his advisers to re-consider American objectives in Lebanon. Reagan,
of course, decided to keep the Marines in the country while continuing to hope

60 M artin and Walcott, 105.
61 Ibid., 105.
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for the w ithdraw al of all foreign forces. In the afterm ath of the attack, historians
know that the adm inistration attem pted to w ork harder to achieve this objective.
Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 92 ("Accelerating the
W ithdraw al of Foreign Forces from Lebanon") less than ten days after the
incident 62 Unfortunately for researchers, NSDD 92 remains entirely classified at
present. W hen this docum ent is declassified, it will be possible to provide a more
definitive assessment of w hat officials were considering in the spring of 1983. In
a larger sense, however, it is abundantly clear that Reagan willfully ignored the
dangers that confronted all of the Americans stationed in Lebanon at the time. It
is difficult to understand why the Reagan administration did not do more to
protect the m ultinational force given the vulnerabilities that became obvious on
April 18. Yet according to General Vessey, the answer is actually quite simple;
"[a]!though it was a great tragedy," he maintains, "it seemed like an inexplicable
aberration."63 Six months later, w hen another suicide mission killed 241
American servicemen, Reagan w ould realize how w rong they had been.

62 National Security Decision Directive 92,27 April 1983, Ronald Reagan Library,
[note: the text of this directive remains classified].
63 Martin and Walcott, 105.

Chapter 2: The End of Innocence
Lebanon will, in my mind, always stand as a major reproach
to me because I was not more persuasive, in all the meetings
we held, to prevent the worst loss of military lives to occur
during the time I was at the Pentagon.—Caspar W einbergeri

In the m onth that followed the embassy bombing in April, Secretary of
State George Shultz increased his efforts to resolve the ongoing Lebanese crisis.
Shultz's negotiations helped to produce the peace treaty between Israel and
Lebanon that was signed
agreement,

on May 17, 1983. Commonly know n as the May 17

the docum ent technically ended Israel's w ar against Lebanon.Both

nations agreed to respect the international border separating them, and the
agreem ent established a security region in southern Lebanon. 2 The security
zone, of course, was one of Israel's prim ary dem ands, since they wanted to
prevent the resurgence of terrorist attacks against settlements in the north.
According to the terms of the agreement, Israel pledged to completely w ithdraw
their forces from Lebanon w ithin three months. At the time, it appeared that
Shultz had m anaged to achieve the impossible. Yet other adm inistration officials
w ere extremely skeptical of the May 17 agreement. "Why such an agreement
was reported to us in such glowing terms by George Shultz has always remained
a m ystery to me," observed W einberger in his memoirs.^ Skeptics in the
adm inistration knew something that the American public did not; in order to get
Israel's approval, Shultz had arranged a secret side letter that essentially

1 W einberger, 173.
2 Farida Abu Izzeddin Sarieddine, "Reagan's Foreign Policy: A Case Study of
Lebanon, 1982-1984" (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1999), 221-222.
3 W einberger, 155-156.
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underm ined the entire peace agreement. The letter, which w ould later become
public, said that Israel w ould only have to w ithdraw if there was a simultaneous
evacuation of Syrian forces.4
Once again, the Reagan adm inistration revealed that it did not understand
the complexity of the relationship between Lebanon, Israel, and Syria. According
to George Ball's astute analysis of the May 17 agreement, "[h]ow any American
governm ent could have so wildly misread the reactions of Damascus will no
doubt puzzle future historians/'s It is indeed confusing to understand why Shultz
described the agreement so optimistically, especially since he was fully aware of
the side letter. Shultz, like many of Reagan's advisers, has blamed the failure of
the peace accords on the Soviet Union and Syria, who supposedly "were
determ ined to see that the region remained a tense and dangerous place." 6 By
accusing the Syrians of prolonging the crisis in Lebanon, he gave the impression
that they had been involved in the negotiations and then backed out afterwards.
In reality, the only parties bound by the May 17 agreement were Lebanon and
Israel. Ball has convincingly argued that Shultz would have been more successful
if he had included Syrian representatives. From his perspective, "[a] less obtuse
American diplomacy would have recognized Syria's security concerns and
predicted that, if Israel were offered a security zone, the Syrians w ould inevitably
insist on a comparable zone of their own."7 Syria, in other words, believed that
their interests in Lebanon had been ignored. They had been invited to Lebanon

4 Ball, 66.
5 Ibid., 68.
6 Shultz, 220.
7 Ball, 69.
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rather than invading it, but unlike Israel, they were not receiving any incentive to
leave.
In essence, the Reagan administration continued to defend Israeli
dem ands. Shultz could have done more to force the w ithdraw al of the IDF from
Lebanon, b u t his acceptance of the secret side letter m ade the May 17 agreement
irrelevant from the m om ent it was signed.

Rather than bringing stability to

Lebanon, the treaty actually contributed to an increasing level of domestic
turmoil. Am in Gemayel soon realized that he had acquired many enemies by
supporting the peace accords. The political factions that opposed Gemayel's rule
discovered that the agreem ent provided them w ith a sense of unity, and in July,
a coalition called the National Salvation Front was form ed to prevent the
im plem entation of the treaty.

The National Salvation Front exposed the

relationship betw een the United States and the Lebanese government.

Not

surprisingly, opponents of Gemayel viewed the Marines as an army of
occupation; Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze, m ade this point abundantly
clear while visiting Syria: "The mere fact that they [the Marines] are providing
the Lebanese factional army w ith logistic support, expertise, and training is
enough for us to consider them enemies."8
Prior to the May 17 agreement, opposition to the multinational force
certainly existed. The Marines had been attacked in March, and at the beginning
of May, someone on the ground fired a missile at an American helicopter. When
news of the negotiations reached Lebanon, however, hostility to the United
States became even m ore w idespread, since the treaty seemed to rew ard Israel
8 Jumblatt quoted in Sarieddine, 210.
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for the 1982 invasion. Opposition leaders finally grasped that the United States
was taking sides w ith the Gemayel government.

The Reagan adm inistration

w orked hard to prevent Gemayel from backing away from the agreement, but
in order to mollify the opposition, he later decided to oppose i t 9
In retrospect, w hen the failure of the May 17 agreement became apparent
to his adm inistration, Reagan should have ordered the Marines to withdraw.
The twin objectives of American policy in Lebanon—internal stability and the
complete w ithdraw al of foreign armies—remained entirely out of reach despite
m onths of negotiations from Shultz. Both Syria and Israel rem ained in Lebanon,
. and the political situation in Beirut was actually getting worse.

The

adm inistration had hoped that the American contingent of the multinational
force w ould help to achieve the objectives of the United States.

During the

congressional hearings that followed the barracks attack, military officials
explained that their mission in Beirut was to establish an American presence that
w ould facilitate diplomatic efforts. One member of the Committee On Armed
Services jokingly rem arked that the position of the Marines was analogous to a
bouncer in a night club who does not have the authority to remove unruly
patrons.10 W hen seen in this light, the entire concept of presence seemed
somewhat ridiculous.

In fairness, though, some administration officials did

recom m end the w ithdraw al of the Marines prior to October 23. Realizing that
the multinational force could not help the United States attain their objectives,
9 Ball, 70.
10 Review of Adequacy of Security Arrangements for Marines in Lebanon and Plans for
Improving that Security , Hearings Before The Committee On Arm ed Services And The
Investigations Subcommittee Of The Committee On A rm ed Services, H ouse Of
Representatives (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 48.
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Weinberger believed that it was time to end the mission. "Because we could not
achieve the objectives for w hich we had entered/' Weinberger has explained, "I
urged repeatedly that we should dissolve the MNF and leave." n
Despite the recom m endations of Weinberger, however, the Marines
rem ained at Beirut International Airport. Factions within Lebanon continued to
target the m ultinational force during the sum m er of 1983. It became norm al for
the Marines to receive sniper fire, and at the end of July, two Americans were
w ounded. According to the rules of engagement enacted for the mission, the
Marines could only fire in self-defense. The Americans frequently saw armed
m en walking near their fortifications at the airport. Since they understood that
the Marines were completely helpless, the militiamen sometimes taunted them.
They entertained themselves by pointing at the Americans and yelling, '"bang,
bang." 12 The Marines, unable to shoot back in these situations, could only
respond w ith their middle fingers.
All of the joking ended on August 28, 1983 w hen the Marines were
granted permission to return fire for the first time since they had been sent to
B e i r u t . 13

O n the following day, the Americans came under intense m ortar fire

along the perim eter of the airport. One of the rounds hit the tent that housed the
com mand of the 1st Platoon, w ounding several m en and killing both Staff
Sergeant Alexander Ortega and Second Lieutenant George Losey.14

Prior to

A ugust 29, the attacks on the multinational force had been mostly sporadic. The
Weinberger, 158.
Hammel, 123.
13 Cannon, 366.
i4Richard Bernstein, "2 Marines Killed In Lebanon And 14 Others Are W ounded
As Beirut Fighting Spreads," The New York Times, 30 August 1983: A l; Hammel, 125-135.
11
12
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shelling that killed Ortega and Losey was unprecedented; based on the available
descriptions of the incident, it seems apparent that the Marines were the intended
targets of the m ortar fire. Some officials suggested that the summ er violence
had little connection to the American mission in Lebanon.

They gave the

impression that the Marines simply had been caught in the cross-fire. In the
opinion of General Paul X. Kelley, the Com mandant of the Marines, "[wjhoever
is shooting at us . . . is shooting m ore at where we are than who we are. There is
no indication anybody is purposefully taking [M]arines under fire."is This
assessment is inaccurate to say the least, and it is also should be noted that the
first American combat deaths in Beirut occurred on the day after the Marines
returned fire. A lthough it is impossible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the tw o events were connected, basic common sense certainly suggests that the
decision to return fire on August 28 directly contributed to the deadly attack on
the next day.
The violence in August convinced the Marine commanders in Beirut that
they needed to move their m en to a safer location. Tragically, the building that
they selected w ould be the one destroyed by a suicide bom ber in October, but at
the time, the sturdy concrete structure provided the Marines w ith protection
against snipers and m ortar

f i r e . 16

Within a week after the deaths of Ortega and

Losey, Israel w ithdrew from the Shuf, a m ountainous region overlooking Beirut,
and m oved south to the Awali River. The withdraw al of the Israelis led to the
deterioration of an already chaotic situation. With the LAF and the Druze militia

15 Kelley quoted in Ball, 74.
Weinberger, 157.
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clashing in the Shuf, the Marines continued to occupy the low ground around the
airport. This became an increasingly hazardous position, and two Marines were
killed on September 6.17 Four days later, President Reagan issued National
Security Decision Directive 103 ("Strategy For Lebanon"). NSDD 103 re-iterated
the two objectives outlined in NSDD 64, which implied that the mission in
Lebanon had not changed since the initial deployment of American forces. In
reality, though, NSDD 103 significantly altered American objectives in the region.
It concluded that "material and training assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces
should be accelerated and expanded as feasible," and more importantly, it called
for the "aggressive self-defense against hostile or provocative acts from any
quarter."!8
Three sections on the second page of NSDD 103 remain classified, and
w hen these are opened to the public, researchers will have a more complete
understanding of American strategy in September 1983.

Nevertheless,

aggressive self-defense is undoubtedly the key phrase in NSDD 103.

How

aggressive self-defense differed from regular self-defense was never clarified,
and the authors of the directive remained committed to the idea that the Marines
were acting as peacekeepers. "Our actions in this regard should demonstrate our
impartiality in the confessional conflict," the docum ent stated. 19

Yet the

multinational force had been working in conjunction w ith the LAF since their
arrival a year earlier. During the first year of American intervention in Lebanon,

17 Ball, 74.
is National Security Decision Directive 103,10 September 1983, Ronald Reagan
Library, 1.
19 Ibid., 1.
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the United States had provided training, weapons, and logistical support to the
soldiers loyal to Amin Gemayel.

On Sunday, September 11, the Reagan

adm inistration took the relationship between Gemayel and the United States
governm ent to the next level. The intense fighting in the Shuf on the previous
day between the Druze and LAF raised the possibility that the Lebanese
governm ent might lose the strategic village of Suq-al-Gharb, and if this
happened, hostile factions w ould be within striking distance of East Beirut.
Robert McFarlane, the successor to Philip Habib as Middle Eastern special
envoy, conferred w ith advisers to discuss the latest developments in Beirut. As
journalists David C. M artin and John Walcott have explained, McFarlane
proceeded to send a flash cable from Lebanon to W ashington that they describe
as "the most dram atic docum ent in the sad history of the American involvement
in L ebanon/'20 Reagan's top foreign policy advisers w ould later refer to
McFarlane's message as the sky is falling cable. The opening sentences of the
cable reflect a sense of urgency and panic: "There is a serious threat of a decisive
military defeat which could involve the fall of the Government of Lebanon
w ithin twenty-four hours. Last night's battle was waged w ithin five kilometers
of the Presidential Palace.

For those at the State Department, this would

correlate to the enemy attacking from Capitol

H i l l . " 21

McFarlane made specific

reference to NSDD 103, arguing that the fall of Suq-al-Gharb would put the
multinational force in the line of fire. As a consequence, he called on Washington
to assist the LAF w ith fire support. Oddly enough, he reasoned that such a

20 M artin and Walcott, 119.
21 Ibid., 119.
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display of force would be defensive action. According to McFarlane's assessment
of the situation, "we m ust recognize that to wait until an attack tonight is at our
doorstep before responding w ould be too late. "22
McFarlane later explained that he considered September 11 to be "the
m om ent of tru th for our entire Lebanese

s tr a t e g y ." 2 3 I f

the LAF lost control of

Suq-al-Gharb, he believed that the Gemayel governm ent w ould be overthrown.
In fairness to McFarlane, he correctly perceived that the level of violence was
escalating. The American ambassador's residence in Beirut had been hit with
shrapnel during the fighting, and intelligence reports from the field indicated that
a Lebanese com m ander had been hacked to death w ith an axe. After sending the
cable to Washington, McFarlane called National Security Adviser William Clark.
He told Clark that the "basic strategy" of the United States governm ent was at
stake, rem inding him "that Americans are also under fire and the existing rules
of engagem ent provide authority for returning fire if you're being fired

u p o n . "24

A lthough McFarlane had good reason to be concerned about the outbreak of
hostilities in the Shuf, he did not adequately question the information that he
received from the Lebanese government.

He observed in his cable that the

attack on Suq-al-Gharb was "unambiguously

f o r e i g n ." 25

Given this analysis of

the situation, it appears that McFarlane accepted the intelligence sources that
linked the violence to Syrian officers and Palestinian soldiers. It is possible that
foreign forces participated in the fighting outside of Beirut, but it is also clear that
22 Ibid., 120.
23 Robert C. McFarlane (with Zofia Smardz), Special Trust (New York: Cadell &
Davies, 1994), 250.
24 Ibid., 251.
25 M artin and Walcott, 119.
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the Druze militia, one of the many factions w ithin Lebanon that opposed
Gemayel, had a central role in the conflict. Therefore, McFarlane's description of
the situation was misleading; there was a considerable am ount of ambiguity that
McFarlane either did not understand or ignored.
In retrospect, September 11 was not the m om ent of truth for American
involvement in Lebanon. Yet McFarlane's cable and his subsequent phone call to
Clark persuaded officials in W ashington to write an addendum to NSDD 103.
Signed by President Reagan on September 11, the addendum echoed the
concerns that McFarlane had expressed earlier that day: "It has been determined
that occupation of the dominant terrain in the vicinity of SUQ-AL-GHARB by
hostile forces will endanger Marine positions."26 The modification to NSDD 103
authorized the use of naval fire and air strikes to help the LAF defend Suq-alGharb. In addition to barring the use of ground forces, the addendum gave the
American com m ander in Beirut the authority to determine w hen the village wras
in jeopardy of falling to the enemy.27 Interestingly, despite McFarlane's
predictions, the LAF retained control of Suq-al-Gharb w ithout American
assistance. A week later, however, Colonel Timothy Geraghty, the commander
of the Marines in Lebanon, received an order to fire on Suq-al-Gharb. According
to tw o officers w ho overheard Geraghty speaking w ith his superiors on the
phone, he attem pted to protest the order: "Do you realize if you do that, we'll
get slaughtered dow n here? We could be severely attacked.

W e're totally

vulnerable. W e're sitting ducks."28 in the end, Geraghty obeyed the command,
26 A ddendum to NSDD 103,11 September 1983, Ronald Reagan Library, 1.
27 ibid., 1.
28 Geraghty quoted in Wright, 78.
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and on September 19, the navy opened fire on the LAF's opposition. The USS
Virginia, a navy cruiser, and three other ships participated in the

a t ta c k .2 9

Eighteen days later, Colonel Thomas Fintel, w ho was responsible for
training the LAF, concluded that the Lebanese most likely could have held onto
Suq-al-Gharb even if the U nited States had not intervened. Moreover, previous
reports suggested that the LAF had sustained heavy casualties while fighting to
defend the village, but in reality, less than ten Lebanese soldiers had been
k il l e d .30

To put it simply, McFarlane's cable was wildly inaccurate. He claimed

that the fall of one location w ould lead to the collapse of the Lebanese
governm ent, and he also gave the impression that the Syrians were determ ined
to take over Lebanon. In fact, after the USS Virginia shelled the enemies of the
LAF, McFarlane visited the battle site in order to evaluate w hat happened. In
describing this visit in his memoirs, McFarlane compared the victory at Suq-alGharb to the Tet offensive in Vietnam. "Just as the N orth Vietnamese had
decided to challenge the Americans and the local national government and
failed," he said, "so, too, had Syrian-backed elements tried and failed [in
Lebanon]."31 McFarlane clung to the illusion that the entire Lebanese crisis was
inextricably connected to Syria. If the United States could get the Syrians out of
Lebanon, he believed, the Gemayel government w ould be stabilized.

His

reasoning epitomized the style of decisionmaking that led Lyndon Johnson to
escalate the w ar in Vietnam; w ith American determination and military power, it
w ould be possible to create a nation in the image of the U nited States.
29 McFarlane, 251.
30 Wright, 78.
31 McFarlane, 252.
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Unfortunately,

as

Johnson

learned

during

Vietnam,

American

intervention-even the com m itm ent of over 500,000 soldiers—does not guarantee
success. Yet Robert McFarlane never learned the lessons of Vietnam. Rather
than focusing on negotiations to achieve American objectives in Lebanon, he
thought that military supremacy w ould suffice. McFarlane even attem pted to
intimidate President Hafez al-Assad of Syria by mentioning that Reagan had
ordered the deploym ent of the USS New Jersey, the navy's only battleship, to the
Lebanese

s h o r e . 32

When Assad reacted indifferently to the news, McFarlane did

not know how to respond. McFarlane's strategy clearly "show ed a lamentable
naivete" that m ade Assad m uch m ore resistant to withdraw ing his soldiers from
the

c o u n t r y .33

In retrospect, the Reagan administration should have made

genuine concessions to Assad.

Given the intimidation tactics that McFarlane

used, it is not surprising why Syria became increasingly distrustful of the United
States during the Reagan presidency. Having failed to win concessions from
Assad, McFarlane became so desperate that he contacted his pastor to pray for
peace in

L e b a n o n . 34

The United States truly needed a miracle in the fall of 1983,

but divine intervention never arrived.
The violent turn of events betw een August and September drew the
attention of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. At the end of
August, Senator Robert Byrd (Democrat-West Virginia) w rote a letter to Reagan
in which he dem anded acknowledgement of the War Powers Act and "a

Ibid., 253.
Ball, 80.
34 McFarlane, 253.
32
33
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reassessment of the situation" in Lebanon.^5 He rem inded Reagan that the
Marines had been committed with the expectation of a relatively short mission,
and he em phasized the importance of having clearly defined objectives.
Representative Henry B. Gonzalez (Democrat-Texas) also requested Reagan to
re-consider America's presence in the conflict, since both Syria and Israel
appeared intransigent.

"In these conditions," wrote Gonzalez, "it is not only

prudent, b u t absolutely necessary, to ask w hat the further risk of our young m en
can accomplish, w hat our interests are, and w hether or not changefs] in policy
are

w a r r a n t e d ." 3 6

For the first time since it had been passed in 1973, Congress

invoked the War Powers Act. O pponents of Reagan's policy correctly believed
that the Marines were now involved in combat, and as a consequence, they
dem anded that Reagan officially notify both houses of Congress under the
provisions of the act.
The debate that ensued within Congress would eventually produce a
compromise on September 29. The legislation perm itted the extension of the
mission for another eighteen months, but in return, the Reagan adm inistration
agreed to accept the applicability of the War Powers Act. In the Senate, while
only two Democrats voted in favor of the bill, all but three Republicans gave
their support to the Reagan administration. Senator Dan Quayle, a Republican
from Indiana, explained that the legislation was designed to give Reagan and his
advisers "breathing room," but he also observed that the Senate vote was not

35 Senator Robert C. Byrd to President Ronald Reagan, 31 A ugust 1983, Ronald
Reagan Library, (WHORM Subject File, CO086, Casefile 161289), 1.
36 Representative H enry B. Gonzalez to President Ronald Reagan, 2 September
1983, Ronald Reagan Library (WHORM Subject File, CO086, Casefile 161467), 2.
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the equivalent of a blank check: "I w ould hope he knows that there's not a true,
genuine support for his policies in

C o n g r e s s ." 37

Senate Democrats argued that

Reagan had placed Americans in a dangerous position that would only get
worse. "Some say that Lebanon is not V ietnam /' said Senator Edward Kennedy
(Democrat-Massachusetts); "But I reply, we m ust not give the President the
pow er to turn it into

o n e ."38

However, since the Democrats did not hold the

majority in the Senate, they could not block the measure.
The opponents of Reagan's policy in Lebanon missed the opportunity to
m ount a strong resistance in the H ouse of Representatives where the Democrats
w ere the majority party. H ouse Speaker Tip O'Neill orchestrated the deal w ith
the White House over the W ar Powers Act, and his political maneuvering
persuaded 130 Democrats to vote for the legislation.

O'Neill's decision to

support the adm inistration revealed a profound ignorance of American foreign
policy. At the beginning of September, he had been invited to a meeting w ith
Robert McFarlane. McFarlane, of course, told O'Neill that the Syrians and Israelis
w ould soon w ithdraw from Lebanon and that the Lebanese government had
prom ised to reform the cabinet. "Put that way," O'Neill recalled, "the presence
of the [Mjarines m ade sense. But at the time, nobody m entioned that their real
mission [sic] was to protect the highly exposed Beirut

a ir p o r t." 3 9

Given his

position of power, O'Neill had the responsibility to critically evaluate the
information that he received from McFarlane.
37

Anyone familiar with the

Steven V. Roberts, "Congress Agrees To Allow Marines To Stay In Beirut,"

The New York Times, 30 September 1983: A l, A8.

38 Ibid., A l.
39 Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (with William Novak), Man of the House: The Life and
Political Memoirs of Speaker Tip O'Neill (New York: Random House, 1987), 363.
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Lebanese situation w ould have told him that the w ithdraw al of foreign forces
was not imminent. Yet O'Neill never sought the advice of an unbiased State
D epartm ent analyst, and as a result, he became the paw n of the Reagan
administration.

According to John Aloysius Farrell, "the White House had

skillfully m anipulated the Speaker—getting him to endorse an unpopular and
unwise exercise in Lebanon . . . [and then using] him for cover w hen it went sour
." 4 0

N ot only did O'Neill arrange the eighteen m onth extension, he delivered a
poignant speech in which he implored fellow Democrats to support the Marines
stationed in Lebanon.

He assured his colleagues that Reagan was deeply

concerned w ith the safety of the American contingent of the multinational force,
and representatives claimed that the speech changed several

v o t e s . 41

In essence,

O'Neill turned Lebanon into a political bargaining chip; although he was
obviously a consummate politician w hen it came to domestic issues, he simply
did not understand the value of statesmanship. Frustrated w ith Reagan's victory
in Congress, Senator Robert Byrd nicely summarized the fundam ental problem
of the legislation: "Politics is the art of compromise.

W ar is

n o t." 4 2

Several

m onths later, w hen O'Neill turned against American involvement in Lebanon,
Reagan accused him of being unpatriotic. Outraged by the comment, O'Neill
w ent on the offensive. "The deaths [of the Marines] lie on him [Reagan] and the
defeat in Lebanon lies on him and him alone," he

d e c la r e d .4 3

Although O'Neill

40 John Aloysius Farrell, Tip O'Neill and the Democratic Century (New York: Little,
Brown and Company, 2001), 619.
41 Ibid., 615.
42 Roberts, A8.
43 O'Neill quoted in Farrell, 619.
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had every right to feel betrayed, someone with his political experience should
have know n better.

He had the opportunity to pressure Reagan to end

American intervention in Lebanon, but he failed to take advantage of the
situation in September. In fairness, even if O'Neill managed to force Reagan to
pull out the Marines, it is unlikely that the w ithdraw al would have been executed
before the barracks bombing on October 23. At the same time, however, O'Neill
shares at least some of the blame for w hat was one of the w orst debacles in the
history of American foreign relations.
During the time betw een the Congressional compromise and the attack on
the Marines in Beirut, the situation on the ground remained unstable despite the
successful intervention at Suq-al-Gharb. American helicopters came under fire at
the beginning of October, and the following week two Marines were killed in
separate incidents.

The multinational force repeatedly returned fire against

enemy snipers w ho were targeting them from buildings in the vicinity of the
airport. Even Reagan's supporters began to recognize that the American deaths
were not accidental.
hardened.

At this point, the existing divisions w ithin the cabinet

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who had opposed the

Lebanon venture from the beginning, clashed w ith McFarlane and Secretary of
State George Shultz. Although Shultz and McFarlane believed that withdrawal
from Lebanon w ould underm ine the credibility of the United States in the Middle
East, Weinberger saw it differently. On October 18, 1983, Weinberger informed
President Reagan at a meeting of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG)
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that the Pentagon recom m ended the removal of the Marines from the airport.44
Weinberger developed an extensive argum ent to support the military's
recommendation. He argued that the position in Beirut was indefensible; that
the CIA had credible information to suggest the possibility of terrorist attacks on
the m ultinational force; that the last vestiges of neutrality had been destroyed
w hen the navy fired to support the LAF; and that American casualties were on
the rise 45 After Weinberger finished, journalist Patrick Sloyan has explained that
the NSPG took a short break.

Weinberger apparently rem oved his

recom m endation from the agenda before the meeting re-convened. It remains
unclear w hy Weinberger did this, and it also should be noted that the Reagan
adm inistration refuted Sloyan's account w hen it first appeared in 1984.
Future historians will w ant to closely examine w hat happened at the NSPG
m eeting on October 18. If W einberger presented the Pentagon recom mendation
w ith such forcefulness, in other words, why did he w ithdraw it during the break?
As m ore documents are de-classified, it will become possible to provide a m uch
better explanation for his actions. Assuming that Sloyan's version of events is
accurate, Reagan never actually rejected the military's request to w ithdraw the
Marines from Lebanon. Once again, Reagan avoided making a decision that
w ould have created conflict in his cabinet. A more decisive president would have
acted differently. "H ad Reagan given the order that day," Sloyan has claimed,
"the troops could have been evacuated within twenty-four hours, Marine Corps

44 Patrick J. Sloyan, "The W arnings Reagan Ignored," The Nation, 27 October
1984: 410.
45 Ibid., 410.
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officers estimated at the tim e /'46 This piece of information is somewhat
misleading, since it appears that the Marine estimate was geared towards a
worst-case scenario. If Reagan had decided to w ithdraw the Americans in the
multinational force, it almost certainly would have been a gradual evacuation.
As a consequence, the implication that the barracks bombing could have been
averted at the NSPG meeting on October 18 is unfounded. Yet one wonders
why adm inistration officials did not request the tightening of security in Beirut
given CIA reports of a potential terrorist attack.
On the day after the meeting, a Marine convoy in Beirut became the target
of an unsuccessful ambush. The failed attack confirmed the reliability of CIA
sources in the region, and less than a week later, a suicide bomber destroyed the
Marine headquarters at the Beirut International Airport, killing 241 Americans.
McFarlane, who had been recently appointed National Security Adviser, notified
Reagan of the attack at around 2:30 AM.

Reagan and his wife returned to

W ashington from their vacation at Augusta National Golf Course four hours
later.47 The National Security Council convened for an emergency meeting in the
White H ouse Situation Room, and as the day progressed, the casualty reports
arriving from Beirut only got worse.
Speaking from the Roosevelt Room on the m orning of October 23,
W einberger said that the United States had evidence linking the bombing to Iran
and even suggested that the Soviet Union was a potential suspect. Interestingly,
Weinberger told television viewers that America could not "simply walk away"

46 Ibid., 410.
47 Reagan, 453.
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from Lebanon, since the country w as "absolutely vital to our national in te re s t/^
The anger of the adm inistration was understandable given the circumstances, but
the declarations of Weinberger and other officials were reckless and misleading.
W einberger never really believed that Lebanon had any strategic value, but in
that interview, he unveiled the strategy that the White House w ould use to
justify American involvement in Lebanon in the afterm ath of the bombing. To
be sure, some people in the White House—most notably McFarlane and the
president himself—sincerely interpreted the Lebanese crisis as an outgrow th of
the Cold War. Yet for the m ost part, the adm inistration used the Soviet Union to
deflect criticism.

The United States had intervened in Lebanon for political

reasons that were only remotely related to the Cold War, but w hen everything
began to fall apart and public support evaporated, officials suddenly gave the
impression that the collapse of Lebanon w ould lead to Soviet domination of the
Middle East.
Reagan promised the nation in a televised address that his administration
w ould seek retribution for the attack. "Those who directed this atrocity m ust be
dealt justice, and they will be," he

d e c l a r e d 49

Other officials within the

adm inistration m ade similar comments, and the FBI immediately launched an
investigation into the barracks bombing. A lthough Reagan appeared ready to
execute his policy of swift and effective retribution against those responsible for
the deaths of 241 Americans, he never followed through on his promises. FBI
investigators concluded that the explosion was the result of thorough planning,

48 CBS, Face The Nation, 23 October 1983.
49 Reagan quoted in Wright, 72.
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but the limited am ount of evidence uncovered m ade it difficult to retaliate
effectively. Islamic Jihad, a relatively unknow n terrorist organization at the time,
claimed responsibility for the incident. In a phone call to a French news agency
in Beirut, an anonym ous m an announced that the members of the group were
"the soldiers of God . . . . We are neither Iranians, Syrians nor Palestinians, but
Muslims w ho follow the precepts of the

K o r a n ." 50

Terrorist experts soon

discovered that Islamic Jihad's success came from its invisibility, and on more
than one occasion, the organization would cripple American policy in the Middle
East.
Despite the clandestine nature

of the organization w ho claimed

responsibility for the attack, American intelligence indicated that they operated
terrorist training camps in the Bekaa Valley. In his memoirs, Reagan explained
that he decided not to retaliate because the intelligence information lacked
credibility: "Our intelligence experts found it difficult to establish conclusively
w ho was responsible for the attack on the barracks. A lthough several air strikes
were planned against possible culprits, I canceled them because our experts said
they w ere not absolutely sure they were the right targets. I d id n 't w ant to kill
innocent people."5i Although such an explanation is obviously self-serving,
Reagan's account is certainly plausible enough. Yet three years later, in April
1986, Reagan ordered an attack on Libya that resulted in civilian c a s u a l t i e s . 52 Not
surprisingly, some sources have questioned the validity of Reagan's explanation.
Ibid., 73.
Reagan, 463-464.
52 Bernard Weinraub, "U.S. Jets H it 'Terrorist Centers' In Libya; Reagan Warns
Of New Attacks If Needed; One Plane Missing In Raids On 5 Targets," The New York
Times, 15 April 1986: A l; see also M artin and Walcott, 258-322.
50

51
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Journalist Philip Taubman, for instance, published an article in The New York Times
Magazine in which he asserted that the United States initially planned on joining

the French in an air strike. In the article, which appeared in 1985, Taubman
claimed that American involvement in the mission "was aborted because the
final go-ahead order was not issued in time by the Defense D epartm ent."53
Taubm an's findings suggested that Weinberger, not Reagan, blocked the plans
for American retribution.
McFarlane has even argued that Weinberger violated a direct order from
Reagan to retaliate. After discovering w hat had happened, he immediately told
the

president

about

W einberger's

insubordination,

Reagan

expressed

disappointm ent after hearing the news. "We should have blown ihe daylights
out of them," he allegedly said, "I just d o n 't understand."54 Weinberger, of
course, vehemently denies McFarlane's story, and although he adm its that he
received a phone call from the French Minister of Defense on November 16,
informing him of an impending retaliatory strike, he claims that Reagan had
never issued an order for American participation in the mission. According to
Weinberger, "[t]his is another instance w hen McFarlane's 'recollections,' well
know n to be 'flexible,' differed sharply from those of other . . . participants."55
It remains unclear why the United States did not join the French in an air
strike, and unfortunately, the military documents that could possibly provide an

53 Philip Taubman, "The Shultz-Weinberger Feud," The New York Times Magazine,
14 April 1985: 51.
54 Reagan quoted in McFarlane, 271; see also Teicher, 265-268; for a good
summ ary of the controversy surrounding the planned retaliatory strike, see Robert
Timberg, The Nightingale's Song (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 337-340.
55 W einberger, 162.
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explanation are, of course, still classified.

Although it seems unlikely that

W einberger violated a presidential order, it has been argued that Reagan did
approve an attack on the Sheik Abdullah Barracks during a National Security
Council meeting on Novem ber 14.56 The heated debate between McFarlane and
W einberger will undoubtedly continue until more sources become available. Yet
based on the current evidence, the failure to retaliate reflected Reagan's inability
to make im portant decisions. McFarlane has suggested that the president's poor
decisionmaking "was destructive to our Middle East policy, and damaging to
other foreign policy initiatives as well."57 It w ould be hard for anyone to
disagree w ith McFarlane's conclusions, and as David C. M artin and John Walcott
have noted in their analysis of American intervention in Lebanon, "[i]t was no
w onder that the staff of the National Security Council later concluded that the
best way to serve Reagan was to do his job for him ."58
At the beginning of December, an American F-14 on a routine
reconnaissance mission over Lebanon came under anti-aircraft fire. Although
the plane m ade it back to the USS Kennedy, one of the carriers stationed on the
Lebanese shore, Reagan decided to approve a tactical air strike against Syrian
anti-aircraft positions. The strike on December 4 ended in disaster w hen surfaceto-air missiles brought dow n two planes. One of the pilots had been killed, and
Lieutenant Robert Goodm an became the prisoner of Syrian

s o ld ie r s .5 9

Fortunately for the Reagan administration, Jesse Jackson helped to arrange the

56 M artin and Walcott, 138.
57 McFarlane, 271.
58 Martin and Walcott, 139.
5 9 Ibid., 140-144.
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safe return of Goodman.

Overall, the air strike had accomplished almost

nothing. The pilots m anaged to dam age some of their targets, but w ithin a few
days, the anti-aircraft sites had been successfully repaired. General Vessey, the
Chairm an of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described the mission as "a Chinese fire
drill . . ."60 Once again, Reagan selected a course of action that underm ined
American objectives in the M iddle East. His administration mistakenly believed
that they could intimidate Syria w ith their sophisticated weapons of war, and in
the end, this strategy backfired.
Even after the destruction of the Marine barracks, Reagan and his advisers
- rem ained committed to the objectives in NSDD 64. O n October
. .days after the suicide attack, Reagan signed NSDD

111.

28, 1983,

five

M uch of the docum ent is

still classified, but the sections of it open to the public are quite revealing. On the
second page, Reagan called for the re-assertion of American leadership in the
M iddle East "by acting once m ore in a bold way, especially in the aftermath of
the Beirut tragedies."6* More im portantly, the president authorized the extension
of the rules of engagement on the following page: "The changes [in the ROE]
should allow support to the Lebanese Arm ed Forces (LAF), such as that currently
authorized for Suq al-Gharb, w hen in the judgm ent of the U.S. ground
commander, LAF positions controlling strategic arteries to Beirut are in danger
of being overrun by hostile

f o r c e s . " 62

of the addendum to NSDD

103,

In essence, NSDD

111

expanded the scope

which had been approved by the president on

60 Vessey quoted in Ibid., 144.
61 National Security Decision Directive 111, 28 October 1983, Ronald Reagan
Library, 2.
62 Ibid., 3.
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September 11. The Marine commander in Beirut could now authorize air and
naval strikes in order to assist the LAF in their attem pt to hold the high ground
on the outskirts of the city. By providing fire support to the LAF, the United
States governm ent was clearly pursuing an offensive strategy. Amazingly, the
adm inistration still claimed that the Americans in the multinational force were
neutral peacekeepers in the conflict. NSDD 117, for instance, further outlined "a
policy of vigorous self-defense" that sought to minimize collateral damage. 63
W hen the Americans could not retaliate against those responsible for initiating
hostile fire w ithout putting civilians lives at risk, NSDD 117 m ade it permissible to
fire on "discrete military targets in unpopulated areas which are organizationally
associated w ith the firing units."64
In theory, NSDD 117 sounded reasonable enough, but in practice, it
contributed to some of the most reckless attacks on innocent civilians since the
Vietnam War. With its sixteen inch guns, the USS New Jersey was probably the
m ost powerful non-nuclear w eapon in the American arsenal at the time. It could
fire a 2,700 pound shell several miles, and a single shell had the ability to
obliterate an area the size of a square mile. Although the New Jersey reached the
coast of Lebanon at the end of September, its powerful guns rem ained silent
during October and November. On December 14, however, the ship unleashed
eleven 1,900 pound shells at targets on the ridgeline overlooking Beirut.65
Despite the immense pow er of the New Jersey, the ship's commander did not
63 National Security Decision Directive 117, 5 December 1983, Ronald Reagan
Library, 1.
64 Ibid., 1.
65 Fred Hiatt, "Use of 16-Inch Guns Authorized On Dec. 3; U.S. Com mander H ad
Been Restricted," The Washington Post, 15 December 1983: A40.
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have the information that was necessary to fire the guns accurately. The navy
w ould normally rely on field reporting w hen positioning their weapons, but
given the w idespread violence on the ground, reconnaissance teams were not
dispatched. To make m atters even worse, the am munition used for the sixteen
inch guns was at least thirty years old, which further reduced the accuracy and
effectiveness of the shelling.66
The longer the Marines rem ained in Beirut, the m ore desperate the
situation became.

Eight Marines had been killed during a fire fight in early

December, and another died in January.

As the violence continued, the

American public turned against the Reagan administration's policy in Lebanon.
Only 37% of Americans favored the w ithdraw al of Marines from the country in
October, b u t by the end of January, 58% believed that it was time for the mission
to end.67 Congress, of course, listened to the polls and began to p u t pressure on
the administration.

Despite the rising opposition, Reagan re-iterated his

com mitment to Lebanon on num erous occasions. The National Security Council
even prepared an informational packet for the adm inistration that could be
distributed to Republicans in Congress. In essence, the packet was supposed to
assist Reagan's supporters explain and defend American objectives in Lebanon to
their constituents.

Describing the country as "a flash point of confrontation

betw een Israel and Syria, and potentially between the U.S. and USSR," the NSC
66 Wayne Biddle, "Poor Results In Shelling Laid To Old Ammunition," The New
York Times, 23 October 1984: A15; see also M artin and Walcott, 146.
67 O sm an M ohammed Araby, "The Press A nd Foreign Policy: A Comparative
Study Of The Role Of The Elite Press In U.S. Foreign Policies In The Middle East, The
Sale Of AW ACS Arms Package To Saudi Arabia, The Deployment Of U.S. Marines To
Lebanon, A nd The U.S. Air Raid O n Libya" (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., The University of
Minnesota, 1990), 34.
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docum ent claimed that the "U.S. cannot ignore [the] consequences of just
walking away." 68 The Congressional packet, in other words, claimed that
Lebanon w as vital to America's national security and credibility.
If Lebanon was truly so im portant to American interests, however,
President Reagan w ould have never approved National Security Decision
Directive 123 ("Next Steps in Lebanon") on February 1, 1984. NSDD 123 began
w ith an outline of the three major military problems facing the Lebanese
government, and it called for the military to provide m ore weapons and training
to the LAF. By increasing aid to Gemayel's government, the decision directive
suggested that the United States was simply continuing earlier policies. Yet on
the second page of NSDD 123, Reagan ordered Weinberger and Vessey to
construct a "timetable for the phase dow n of USMNF military personnel ashore
and a plan for the continuing U.S. military presence offshore, taking full account
of political as well as military considerations."69 Removing the Marines from the
Beirut A irport and transferring them to nearby ships represented a major shift in
policy.

Although Reagan did not authorize the phase dow n of the military

mission on February 1, he clearly was searching for a way out. Reagan, like
Richard Nixon, w anted peace w ith honor; unlike Nixon, however, Reagan grew
tired of waiting.
Despite w hat was happening behind the scenes, Reagan made public
statements that were obviously misleading.

On February 4, during a radio

68 "Argum ents Against A nd For The Marine Presence In Lebanon," Ronald
Reagan Library (White House Staff and Office Files: Fortier, Donald: Box 90753,
Lebanon III, Folder 5 / 5), 2.
69 National Security Decision Directive 123,1 February 1984, Ronald Reagan
Library, 2.
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address from Camp David, he explained to Americans why the United States
needed to uphold its com m itm ent to the governm ent of Lebanon: "Yes, the
situation in Lebanon is difficult, frustrating and dangerous. But that is no reason
to turn our backs and to cut and run. If we do, w e'll be sending one signal to
terrorists everywhere. They can gain by waging w ar against innocent people."70
Three days later, while Reagan was making an appearance in Las Vegas, Vice
President George Bush convened a meeting of the National Security Planning
Group. Gemayel had lost control of West Beirut; Congress was dem anding that
the White House change its strategy; and even McFarlane now believed that the
United States needed to w ithdraw . Interestingly, Secretary of State Shultz did
not attend the NSPG meeting, since he had gone to Grenada, which had been
invaded by American forces on October 25.

Shultz's representative at the

meeting, Lawrence Eagleburger, opposed the Marine withdrawal, but everyone
else, including Bush, supported the proposal. Bush then called Reagan, who was
now getting ready to leave for his California ranch on Air Force One, and
informed the president w hat had transpired at the meeting.

Reagan simply

concurred w ith Bush and hung up the phone.7! As Lou Cannon has observed,
Reagan authorized the w ithdraw al "in a phone conversation even briefer than
the one in which he had originally authorized [Philip] Habib to commit the
United States to participate in the MNF."77
On February 6, President Reagan had w ritten a poignant letter to John
Wandell.

Wandell, a young sailor on the USS Guam , was stationed within

70 Reagan quoted in Cannon, 398.
M artin and Walcott, 150; Cannon, 399-400.
72 Cannon, 400.
71

striking distance of Lebanon at the time. Responding to an earlier note from
Wandell, Reagan rem inded him that "[w]e m ust not abandon those who have
relied on our help to build a just and lasting
reached

its destination, Reagan had

p e a c e ." 7 3

By the time the letter

completely reversed

his position.

Adm inistration officials claimed that the removal of American forces from the
airport am ounted to a re-deployment in which the United States would continue
to assist the Lebanese governm ent w ith the navy ships stationed offshore. In
reality, though, everyone seemed to recognize that re-deploym ent was nothing
more than a euphemism for the decision to cut and run.
Donald Rumsfeld, who had replaced McFarlane as the United States envoy
to the Middle East, received the difficult task of informing Gemayel that the
Marines were leaving the country. Rumsfeld and his staff arm ed themselves
w ith handguns and m ade their way to Gemayel's personal bunker at the
presidential palace.

Since Rumsfeld had earlier prom ised Gemayel that the

United States w ould not abandon Lebanon, he expected that the news would
surprise him. Yet Gemayel reacted calmly to the visit, asking questions but not
protesting. Rumsfeld later explained his deep sense of embarrassment at the
meeting; "I just felt terrible," he said, "I felt sick to my

s t o m a c h . " 7*

The Reagan administration, however, was not entirely finished with
Lebanon.

In w hat was perhaps the most vindictive display of military power

since the Christmas bombings during the Vietnam War, the New Jersey fired 288
sixteen inch shells at targets outside of Beirut on February 8, and on the

73 Reagan quoted in Wright, 97.
74 Rumsfeld quoted in M artin and Walcott, 151.
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following day, an American destroyer unleashed over one hundred

r o u n d s . 75

Walid Jumblatt, the architect of the National Salvation Front, initially claimed that
the village of Tebyat had been annihilated. Journalists soon discovered that
Jum blatt's report was exaggerated, b u t they also found evidence to indicate that
the shelling had spread into civilian areas. In Tebyat, for instance, a sixteen inch
shell from the New Jersey killed two and w ounded sixteen.

One resident of

Tebyat questioned why the United States had targeted the village; "We have no
terrorists here, we have no Palestinians here," he

s a id .7 6

Unfortunately, it

remains unclear how much dam age the shelling inflicted on the civilian
population. Although Druze leaders certainly had the tendency to overestimate
the num ber of casualties, it is also clear that non-combatants were killed and
w ounded as a result of American naval

f i r e .7 7

At the time, anonym ous sources

inside the Pentagon said that the shells "hit nothing of military significance," and
Michael Burch, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, adm itted that
"there may have been some

[collateral damage] and

that w ould be

unfortunate."78
The final contingent of Marines w ithdrew from Lebanon at 12:37 in the
afternoon on February 26. Shortly before leaving on a personnel carrier, Lance

75 "N avy's Guns Rake Hills Over Beirut W ith 150 Rounds," The New York Times,
10 February 1984: A l.
76 Judith Miller, "Tour Of 3 Lebanese Villages U.S. Ships Shelled Shows Less
Damage Than Reported," The New York Times, 11 February 1984: Section 1, page 5.
77 Robert Fisk, " 'If We Take Fire . . . W e're Gonna Return It': How a
Peacekeeping Force Took Sides," The Multinational Force in Beirut, 1982-1984, ed.
Anthony McDermott and Kjell Skjelsbaek (Miami: Florida International University
Press, 1991), 179.
78 Rick Atkinson, "Pentagon Keeps Details on Shelling Secret," The Washington
Post, 18 February 1984: A29.
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Corporal Shawn Lamb described how it felt to have served in Beirut. "You have
any good friends?" he asked reporter Thomas Friedman. "How w ould you like
to have them blow n up in their sleep a thousand miles from home in a foreign
country--for nothing?" 79 Although some Marines stayed behind to protect the
American embassy and Army personnel continued to train the LAF, United
States involvement in the multinational force was now over.

Within a few

minutes of the American departure, gunm en m oved into the area surrounding
the airport and raised a green Amal flag where an American flag had once flown.
The m en searched the former Marine headquarters, expressed some interest in
discarded Playboy magazines, and proceeded to secure the airport's

r u n w a y s .8 0

While the gunm en took control of the airport, the New Jersey and the
Caron, a destroyer, blasted their guns at the high ground over Beirut. 81 The 66

rounds fired on February 26 m arked the senseless ending to a senseless foreign
policy in w hich nothing was gained and so m uch was lost. Perhaps a poem
w ritten on the door frame of a M arine bunker at the airport sum m arized it best:
They sent us to Beirut
To be targets who could not shoot.
Friends will die into an early grave,
Was there any reason for what they gave?82

79 Thomas L. Friedman, "Marines Complete Beirut Pullback; Moslems Move In,"
The New York Times, 27 February 1984: A6.

so Ibid., A6.
si Ibid., A l.
82 Friedman, "America's Failure In Lebanon," 32.

Conclusion: The Legacy of Lebanon
If I ever say send in the Marines again [to Lebanon], somebody
shoot m e.~George Shultzi

O n June 14, 1985, over a year after the United States w ithdrew from
Lebanon, TWA Flight 847 took off from Athens w ith 153 people on board.
Carrying 135 American passengers on their way to Rome, the plane was soon
hijacked by two members of Hezbollah. Most of the American hostages did not
understand why the enraged gunm en repeatedly yelled the w ords "New Jersey"
and "Marines."^ As the episode unfolded, however, the references to American
involvem ent in Lebanon gradually became more clear. The lead hijacker, who
the passengers nicknamed Castro, declared at one point that his wife and child
had been killed by bombs from the United States. 3

The hijackers extensively

beat navy diver Robert Stethem, shot him, and then dum ped his body onto the
runw ay in Beirut. They defended their action to the Beirut air traffic controller
by rem inding him of the Bir al Abed massacre in w hich the CIA allegedly
organized a car bomb attack on Sheik M ohammad H ussein Fadlallah.

The

explosion in March 1985 had killed eighty Lebanese civilians but Fadlallah
survived.4
The hijackers shuttled their hostages between Beirut and Algiers for four
days before they finally abandoned the aircraft in Beirut. W hen they evacuated
the plane, they released almost all of the remaining hostages to the Amal militia.

1 M artin and Walcott, 148.
2 Cannon, 536.
3 M artin and Walcott, 173.
4 Cannon, 536.
65
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Thomas M urry, one of the Americans on TWA Flight 847, later recalled that the
final group of prisoners were taken in groups to apartm ents in south Beirut. The
Amal guards took M urry and the other hostages to locations that had been
attacked by the USS New Jersey in 1984, and on many occasions, they attem pted
to explain to their captives w hy ordinary people resorted to terrorism.
According to a guard nam ed Akal, for instance, the United States was directly
involved in the creation of international terrorism:
Think about a young m an in southern Lebanon, a Shiite,
w ho [is a] poor farmer. A nd he's out in the fields working.
A nd some of these Palestinians come in tow n and launch
a rocket attack at the Israelis. The Israelis shoot back and
[the] Palestinians are gone. A nd he gets home to find his
family dead. And here is shell casings stuffed with
American markings on it. A nd he's standing there looking
at that, and a radical comes u p and pats him on the shoulder
and says, 'I'll show you how to get even.' A nd you've got
[yourself a] terrorist .5
Akal, of course, definitely oversimplified the causes of terrorism, but in
retrospect, his observations are historically accurate, since m uch of the terrorist
activity directed at the United States during the Reagan years could be traced
back to American intervention in Lebanon between 1982 and 1984.
After the TWA Flight 847 hostages were released on June 30, Reagan went
on national television to declare w ar on terrorism.

"The United States gives

terrorists no rew ards and no guarantees," he said. "We make no concessions;
w e make no deals. Nations that harbor terrorists underm ine their ow n stability
and endanger their ow n people. Terrorists, be on notice, we will fight back

5 Q uoted in Jeffrey D. Simon, The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience With
Terrorism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 191.
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against you, in Lebanon and

e ls e w h e r e ." 6

The Americans who listened to this

speech did not know that their president had arranged the return of the hostages
by promising the release of Shiite prisoners held in Israel. They also did not
realize that high ranking officials w ithin his administration were already working
on a secret deal w ith Iran to get back the seven American citizens who had been
kidnapped in Lebanon over the previous eighteen months.
As his predecessors had learned in Korea and Vietnam, and as Bill Clinton
w ould later discover in Somalia, Lebanon taught Reagan that there were limits to
America's military hegemony. Even the New Jersey, with its massive guns, could
not stop hostile factions from killing and w ounding Marines in Beirut. Rather
than focusing attention on diplomatic solutions to the Lebanese crisis, Reagan,
like Lyndon Johnson, believed that a military presence would somehow lead to a
peaceful resolution. He repeatedly claimed that the United States would not
abandon the Lebanese people.

In fact, w henever Reagan commented on

America's commitment to Lebanon, Beirut newspapers w ould frequently print
the story on the first page. N ot surprisingly, many people in Lebanon assumed
that the United States w ould stand by these promises. Reagan's rhetoric, which
routinely appeared in the new spapers and on the radio, gave them renewed
confidence in the future of their country. "I thought the Americans had it all
planned out and nothing could go wrong," recalled Nabil Yacoub. "They kept
talking about all their plans and commitments. We thought there would be a
new order in Lebanon patroned by the United States."? Much to Yacoub's

6 Reagan quoted in Ibid., 192-193.
? Yacoub quoted in Friedman, From Beirut To Jerusalem, 208.
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disappointm ent, however, Reagan abandoned Lebanon and did nothing to help
w hen the country began to disintegrate.
While the w ithdraw al of the Marines in 1984 disillusioned supporters of the
United States like Yacoub, enemies of America had much to celebrate.
International terrorists learned from October 23 that one successful truck bomb
had the ability to completely reverse American foreign policy, and in the
afterm ath of the deadly blast, it became apparent to them that Reagan's promise
of swift and effective retribution had been transformed into a policy of inaction
and retreat.

"The message to them was clear," Jeffrey Simon has written,

"[h]ijack the right plane at the right moment, or perpetrate some other dram atic
attack, and you can bring the president of the most pow erful nation in the w orld
to address you and take notice of you." 8 Sadly, the Reagan administration
missed an excellent opportunity to deter future terrorist attacks.

The Long

Commission, which investigated the barracks attack for the Departm ent of
Defense, assigned principal responsibility for the incident to the Marine
com m anders on the ground.

At the same time, however, the Long Report

w arned that the United States was shockingly unprepared to confront
international terrorism.

The commission rem inded policy makers "that state

sponsored terrorism is an im portant part of the spectrum of warfare and that
adequate response to this increasing threat requires an active national policy
which seeks to deter attack or reduce its

e ff e c tiv e n e s s ." 9

While recommending

that the military place more emphasis on counter-terrorism, the report also

8 Simon, 193.
9 Report ofD O D Commission, 14.
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outlined the need for diplomatic and political initiatives to address the problem.
The Reagan adm inistration responded to the recommendations embodied
in the Long Report, and on April 3, 1984, Reagan approved National Security
Decision Directive 138. NSDD 138, which was primarily w ritten by Oliver North,
provided a blueprint for Reagan7s w ar on terrorism. According to the decision
directive, terrorism constituted a direct threat to the national security of the
United States. W henever terrorist groups attacked Americans, it called for the
United States governm ent to strike back at the perpetrators. Yet in the w ords of
Noel Koch, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, NSDD 138 "was simply
ignored.

No p art of it was ever implemented." *0 Frustrated w ith Reagan's

failure to implement NSDD 138, Shultz turned to the American public.

In

num erous speeches and interviews, he w arned that terrorism w ould only
escalate in the years to come, and as a consequence, he said that the United States
needed to take the offensive. "We can expect more terrorism directed at our
strategic interests around the world in the years ahead," he told an audience
gathered at the Park Avenue Synagogue in N ew York. "To combat it, we m ust
be willing to use military force."11
N ot surprisingly, Weinberger disagreed with Shultz's approach to the
situation. In September 1984, a van loaded with explosives drove into the
American embassy annex in East Beirut, killing two Americans and twelve
Lebanese. Although the CIA traced the attack to the Sheik Abdullah Barracks,
Weinberger successfully blocked plans for a retaliatory mission.12 He believed
Koch quoted in M artin and Walcott, 157.
11 Shultz quoted in Simon, 181.
12 M artin and Walcott, 158-159.
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that military force should be used w ith utm ost caution.

In November 1984,

during a speech at the N ational Press Club, Weinberger outlined a set of
principles that are now commonly referred to as the Weinberger Doctrine.
Weinberger m aintained that the United States should only use military
intervention in situations w here American interests w ere threatened and w hen
the objectives were clearly defined and achievable. He emphasized fhat leaders
m ust not commit American troops unless they had the support of the nation.!3
In essence, the ongoing feud between Weinberger and Shultz ham pered
the adm inistration's ability to effectively implement a coherent policy on
terrorism. Despite their m any disagreements, however, they both viewed the
p ro b lem . from a military perspective.

The fundam ental argument, in other

words, pertained to the issue of retaliation. Shultz believed that the United States
had an obligation to fight back, while Weinberger thought that counter
offensives w ere a reckless w aste of resources.

The Reagan years were a

formative time for international terrorism, and unfortunately, no one in the
W hite H ouse took a proactive stance on the issue. If the governm ent of the
United States had done m ore to carefully evaluate the causes of terrorism, it
w ould have better equipped itself to alter the subsequent course of events. In
the final analysis, America failed to take the initiative on counter-terrorism
during the 1980s. Many officials were responsible for this failure, but none more
so than Reagan himself. H ow ard Teicher, who worked for the National Security
Council under Reagan, has provided one of the more revealing assessments of
his boss. "Because he was unwilling to exercise leadership or to enforce discipline
13 Simon, 184.
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w ithin his ow n cabinet/' according to Teicher, "history will judge Ronald Reagan
a weak and indecisive m a n . " 1!
From beginning to end, American intervention in Lebanon was indicative
of that weakness and indecision.

14 Teicher quoted in Martin and Walcott, 160.
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